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1
Introduction
In the mid to late 1980s, responding to the increasingly competitive global
market, organizations in the US began shifting their compensation systems from
noncontingent to performance contingent pay (Latham & Huber, 1992; Lawler, 1990;
O’Dell & McAdams, 1987; Wilson, 1995). Addressing the shift, Hurst (1998) stated
that while traditional compensation systems may effectively attract and retain
workers, “they have never been too successful in motivating the moment-to-moment
individual performance” (p. 13). The performance contingent pay systems have been
adopted in order to align pay with organizational strategies designed to increase
productivity (Abernathy, 1996; Belcher, 1996; Chingos, 1997; Flannery, Hofrichter,
& Flatten, 1996; Lawler, 1990, 2000; Risher, 1999; Schuster & Zingheim, 1992;
Zingheim & Schuster, 2000). Wilson (1995) stated, rather simply, that the reason for
the changes was the fact that “traditional patterns o f management, organization, and
rewards [were] no longer working” (p. 9); that is, US companies were losing their
competitive edge.
In the early 1990s, a survey by Hewitt Associates o f over 2000 US companies
indicated that 68% o f the firms were using some form o f variable or incentive
compensation (Ju ly , 1993). In another study, conducted by the Hay Group, 54% o f
500 large and medium US companies reported that they had begun to change their
pay systems to reflect changes in organizational culture (Flannery et a l, 1996). In
addition, in that same study, 73% acknowledged the necessity to alter their pay
systems so that they would be consistent with new cultural initiatives. Similarly,
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studies from 1986 to 1997 showed “large increases in the percentage o f Fortune 1000
firms using a variety o f compensation innovations” (Ledford & Hawk, 2000, p. 28).
Thus, not only have a large number o f companies altered their pay systems within the
past decade, the trend appears to be continuing.
Several types o f variable pay plans exist. The most popular include employee
stock ownership, profit sharing, gain sharing, pay-for-knowledge or skill, lump sum
bonuses, small group monetary incentives and individual monetary incentives. Only
four basic systems, however, use a predetermined formula to tie compensation to
internal operational or economic measures; profit-sharing, gain-sharing, small group
incentives and individual monetary incentives (Abernathy, 1990; McAdams & Hawk,
1992). In the absence o f a pre-announced formula based on objective measures, pay
cannot truly be contingent on performance (Abernathy, 1990; Honeywell-Johnson &
Dickinson, 1999; Mitchell, Lewin, & Lawler, 1990). Thus, although other types of
pay plans are variable pay plans, they cannot be considered to be performance
contingent pay plans. It should be noted that while employee stock ownership plans
tie pay to economic measures, those measures are based on the market value o f the
stock. Because market value is difficult to control by the organization, the
compensation received by employees is not easily viewed as performance contingent.
Hence, these plans will be excluded from fijrther discussion, as will other forms of
variable pay plans that cannot be considered performance contingent.
Of the four performance contingent compensation systems (profit sharing,
gain sharing, small group incentives and individual incentives), profit sharing and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3
gain sharing link compensation not to individual performance, but to the performance
o f the organization as a whole or to organizational units (Abernathy, 1990;
Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Lawler, 1990). In contrast, individual and
small group incentive systems tie the worker’s pay to the worker’s performance
(Abernathy, 1990; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Lawler, 1990). Although
the point is arguable, profit sharing and gain sharing do not appear to be as effective
as individual and small group monetary incentives with respect to increasing worker
performance (for reviews, see Blinder, 1990; Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Lawler,
1990). This is not surprising from a motivational perspective. Profit sharing bonuses
are based on the profitability o f the entire organization and can be greatly influenced
by factors that are outside the control o f the employee, such as mergers and
acquisitions and the investment o f funds in research and/or new facilities. Bonuses
are typically distributed annually or placed in retirement accounts and, as a result, the
extra pay is far remote from the day-to-day performance o f a worker. Similarly, gain
sharing bonuses are based on the aggregate performance o f workers in an
organizational unit. Disbursements are typically made quarterly or annually, or, like
profit sharing bonuses, deposited in retirement accounts. Thus, they, too, are remote
from day-to-day performance.
In individual incentive systems, employees receive compensation based on
their individual performance. Wilson (1995) described the defining feature o f
individual incentive systems as foUows: employees receive “a predetermined amount
o f money for every unit of work they produce” (p. 115). Thus, the employees’ pay is
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not affected by the work o f others, as it is in group-based systems. In addition,
Bucklin and Dickinson (2001) pointed out that individual incentives have three
additional characteristics that are common to other effective rewards and
consequences: (a) They are based on clearly specified behaviors or outputs, (b) they
are certain (if the behavior or output occurs, employees will receive the extra
compensation), and (c) they are distributed as soon after the performance as possible,
usually in the employee’s regular paycheck. Compensation experts (Conrad, 1994;
Lawler, 1990, 1992; McCoy, 1992; McNally, 1988) and behavioral psychologists
(Braksick, 2000; Brown, 1982; Daniels, 1989; O’Brien & Dickinson, 1982) alike
have emphasized the importance o f these characteristics when the goal o f an
intervention program is to influence work performance.
Group incentives may be set up in a variety o f different ways, but no matter
how they are configured, each employee’s pay is based on the performance o f the
group that includes that employee. They have several features in common with
individual incentives in that they are (a) based on clearly specified behaviors or
outputs, (b) are certain, and (c) distributed in the employee’s regular paycheck
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). Group incentives differ from individual incentives in
that the worker’s pay is not only based on his or her performance, but on the
performance o f others in the group. The size of the group is considered to be an
important factor with respect to the effectiveness o f group incentives (Blinder, 1990;
Honeywell, Dickinson, & Poling, 1997; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999;
Lawler, 1990). As the group size increases, workers cannot affect the performance o f
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the group as much, and hence the link between their performance and pay becomes
weaker.
Surveys conducted over the past decade have consistently reported that 12%16% of U.S. companies use small group incentives (Honeywell et a l, 1997). Peterson
(1992) found that in certain manufacturing industries, 50% o f employees are covered
by group plans. Although individual incentives are more prevalent, the use o f group
incentives is increasing (Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999). In a 1994 Hay
Group survey, 39% o f respondents who did not use group incentives indicated that
they were considering them (Gross, 1995). Similarly, Ledford and Hawk (2000)
reported that Fortune 1000 firms increased their use o f group incentives by 50%
between 1987 and 1996.
In 1966, Opsahl and Dunnette published an extensive review o f “The Role of
Financial Compensation in Industrial Motivation.” While stating that “There is
considerable evidence that installation o f such plans usually results in greater output
per man hour, lower unit costs, and higher wages in comparison with outcomes
associated with straight payment systems” (p. 98), they also pointed out that
“Strangely, in spite o f the large amounts o f money spent and the obvious relevance o f
behavioral theory for industrial compensation practices, there is probably less solid
research in this area than in any other field related to worker performance” (p. 94).
They appealed to researchers to conduct studies in controlled laboratory settings and
to analyze the effectiveness o f different methods of payment in isolation fi'om the
other changes that usually accompany their implementation. In spite o f a long history
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o f use o f monetary incentives and their momentary popularity in the early 1900s (see
Louden, 1944; Milkovich & Stevens, 2000; Mitchell et al., 1990; Opsahl & Dunnette,
1966; Peach & Wren, 1992; Taylor, 1911), little controlled research was conducted
until their resurgence in the 1980s (Blinder, 1990; Dickinson & Gillette, 1993;
Lawler, 1990). For detailed treatments o f the early field studies and experiments,
readers are referred to Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) and Marriott (1957). Readers are
also referred to Parsons (1974) for a detailed analysis o f the effects of incentives
during the Hawthorne studies, conducted between 1924 and 1932, and to Handlin
(1992) and Lincoln (1946, 1951, 1961) for descriptions o f one o f the most successful
and enduring incentive programs — Lincoln Electric’s “incentive management”
program which began circa 1914.
Individual Incentives
Most o f the subsequent controlled laboratory and field studies have focused
on the effectiveness o f individual incentives. Laboratory studies have consistently
demonstrated that performance levels are higher under individual incentive conditions
than under hourly pay conditions (e.g., Berger, Cummings, & Heneman, 1975;
Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Farr, 1976; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990; Honeywell et al.,
1997; Pritchard, Hollenback, & DeLeo, 1980; Pritchard, Leonard, Von Bergen, &
Kirk, 1976; Riedel, Nebeker, & Cooper, 1988; Smoot & Duncan, 1997). Individual
incentives have also resulted in higher performance in the work place (e.g.,
Abernathy, Duffy, & O’Brien, 1982; Bushhouse, Feeney, Dickinson, & O’Brien,
1982; Gaetani, Hoxeng, & Austin, 1985; George & Hopkins, 1989; LaMere,
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Dickinson, Henry, Henry, & Poling, 1996; Latham & Dossett, 1978; Nebeker &
Neuberger, 1985; Saari & Latbam, 1982; Stajkovic & Lutbans, 2001; Wagner &
Bailey, 1997; Yukl & Latbam, 1975; Yukl, Latbam, & Pursell, 1976; YuM, Wexley,
& Seymore, 1972).
It has been argued that these changes in performance are likely to be due to
ebanges in the amount o f time an individual spends on or off task (Bucklin &
Dickinson, 2001; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000). To this extent, it is important for
researchers to include viable alternative activities for participants to engage in. If the
alternatives are not realistic alternatives, participants may spend all of their time
performing the experimental task regardless o f the pay system in effect.
Group Incentives
With group incentives, the pay a worker receives is dependent not only on bis
or her performance, but on the performance o f the other members in the group. Thus,
the link between performance and pay is weaker than with individual incentives. As
the size o f the group increases, the link between a worker’s pay and bis or her
performance becomes weaker due to the fact that the worker’s contribution to the
group’s perfomiance becomes smaller. That is, the worker has less control over the
total group’s performance and hence bis or her earnings. In small groups, however,
the worker’s performance constitutes a sizable proportion o f the group’s total
performance and thus the worker stiU has a certain degree of control over bis or her
earnings. Because o f that, even though large group incentives may not effectively
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influence a worker’s performance, small group incentives may (Honeywell et al.,
1997).
The effects o f group monetary incentives have not been as extensively
researched as the effects o f individual incentives. In a recent review o f the literature,
Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) stated that “relatively few ejqperimental
investigations have examined the effects of group monetary incentives on the
performance o f groups that are o f the size typically found in the workplace” (p. 116).
Their search o f the literature, which excluded survey studies, uncovered only 12
experimental studies, four o f which were unpublished. Most o f these studies
examined groups o f under 10 members. Only two field studies examined groups o f
over 12 members. Noting the small number o f studies, Dickinson (2000) emphasized
the need to conduct additional research, particularly in light of the fact that group
incentive systems are being increasingly adopted by organizations.
The author recently searched the literature and located two experimental
studies (Honeywell-Johnson, McGee, Culig, & Dickinson, 2002; Thurkow, Bailey, &
Stamper, 2000) that were conducted after Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson’s (1999)
review, bringing the total number o f known studies to 14. Five o f the 14 studies
examined the effects of group incentives and hourly pay, three compared cooperative
(equally divided) and competitive (differentially divided) group incentives, four
examined the effects o f group size on performance, and ten compared group and
individual incentives. Only two studies investigated the effects o f group incentives on
high performance, which is the focus o f the proposed study.
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Group Incentives versus Hourly Pay
As stated previously, 5 o f the 14 studies compared the eifects o f small group
monetary incentives and hourly pay. Four of the studies were conducted in a
laboratory setting (Farr, 1976; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Miroff, Naylor,
Lubeach, Greenberg, GiUen, Sitarsky, & Duncan, 1993; Smoot, 1997). Farr (1976)
examined forty-eight three-member groups in a between group study, Smoot (1997)
examined six three-member groups using a within-subject multiple baseline design,
and Miroff et al. (1993) examined four five-member groups using a combined
multiple baseline and group design. Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) used simulated
ten-person groups. That is, during the group incentive condition, the four participants
were told that they were members o f a ten-person group and that their data would be
combined with the data o f the nine other group members. Honeywell-Johnson et al.
(2002) adopted a single subject research design. In all o f the studies, the incentives
earned by the group were equally divided among the group members. Farr also
included a competitive group incentive condition during which the top performer
received 50% o f the incentives earned by the group, the middle performer received
33%, and the bottom performer received 17%. Tasks consisted o f sorting computer
cards punched with various combinations o f holes (Farr, 1976), assembling parts
made fi-om pop beads (Miroff et al., 1993; Smoot, 1997), and performing a
computerized work task (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002). In all four studies
performance was higher when participants were paid group monetary incentives than
when they were paid hourly, regardless o f whether the incentives were equally
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divided among group members (Farr, 1976; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Miroflf
et al., 1993; Smoot, 1997) or differentially divided (Farr, 1976).
In the one field study comparing the differential effects o f group incentives
and hourly pay, Allison, Silverstein, and Galante (1992) compared the number o f
tasks workers completed when they were paid hourly wages, cooperative group
incentives and competitive group incentives. Twelve teaching assistants for disabled
children participated in the study. All 12 participants were exposed to all o f the pay
conditions. In the cooperative group incentive condition, the available incentives were
shared equally among the 12 workers. In the competitive group incentive condition,
the available incentives were divided equally among the top three workers. As in the
laboratory studies, participants performed better when they were exposed to both o f
the group incentive conditions than when they were paid hourly.
The results of aforementioned studies have been consistent. For groups
ranging in size Jfrom 3 to 12 members, group monetary incentives have resulted in
higher levels o f performance than hourly pay.
Group Size
As indicated earlier, group size may play a key role in the effectiveness o f
group incentives. As the size of the group increases, the relationship between a
worker’s pay and performance decreases. This occurs because the worker’s ability to
affect the group’s performance decreases. Blinder (1990) referred to this as the “1/nth
problem,” in which “n” represents the number o f employees in the group. As “n”
increases, the worker loses control over his or her wages and hence the effectiveness
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o f group incentives is likely to decrease (Blinder, 1990; Honeywell-Johnson &
Dickinson, 1999; Honeywell et a l, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989). Applying
similar logic, Lawler (1990) stated that the worker’s “line o f sight” becomes obscured
as the size o f the incentive group becomes larger, hence productivity is likely to
suffer. When the size o f the group is relatively small, however, the worker retains a
certain degree o f control over the group’s performance and hence his or her earnings.
Thus, group incentives may effectively influence performance when the work group
is small.
The effects o f group size on performance were investigated in four o f the
fourteen studies. Two early field studies (Campbell, 1952; Marriott, 1949) examined
the effects o f group incentives on the performance o f large groups-the only two
studies that have done so. In Campbell’s study, groups ranged in size from under 20
to over 100 workers. In Marriott’s (1949) study, groups ranged in size from under 10
to over 50. Workers received incentives based on the group’s total productivity, hence
they all received the same amount o f incentive. In both studies, performance
decreased as the size of the group increased.
The results o f investigations with small groups have differed from the results
reported by Campbell (1952) and Marriott (1949). Stoneman and Dickinson (1989)
and Roberts and Leary (1990) examined the effects o f equally divided group
incentives on the performance of groups ranging in size from two to nine members.
Both studies were conducted in the laboratory and between group comparisons were
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used in both. In the two studies, the performance o f the groups was comparable
regardless o f the size o f the group.
The most likely reason for the dfflFerences in results between the two field
studies and the two laboratory studies is the size of the groups that were examined.
However, Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) mentioned three additional
factors that may have contributed to the differences: (a) the length o f exposure to the
pay systems; (b) the amount o f the incentives; and (c) differing types o f social
interactions. Nonetheless, the results o f the four studies suggest that group incentives
are likely to be (a) less effective with large groups than with small groups, and (b)
equally effective with groups o f ten and fewer members.
Group Incentives versus Individual Incentives
Both small group and individual monetary incentives have been shown to
result in higher levels o f performance than hourly pay. Additionally, group incentives
appear to be equally effective with groups ranging in size from two to ten members.
The logical question thus becomes whether small group monetary incentives are as
effective as individual incentives. Compensation experts have argued that because
individual incentives are more closely tied to the individual’s performance, they are
more likely to result in higher levels o f performance (Dierks & McNally, 1987;
Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999; Lawler, 1990; McAdams & Hawk, 1992).
Results indicating that differentially divided group incentives may produce higher
levels of performance than equally divided group incentives (Farr, 1976; Weinstein &
Holzbach, 1973) support this argument due to the fact that when incentives are
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differentially distributed, the amount o f incentive pay that a worker receives is more
dependent on his or her performance. On the other hand, as argued earlier, in
groups individuals retain considerable control over the group’s total productivity.
Thus, small group incentives may exert as much control over performance as
individual incentives (Honeywell et al., 1997; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson,
1999). It is also the case that group incentive plans may be more appealing to
organizations because o f the increasing prevalence o f work teams and the fact that, in
most cases, group plans are easier to administer (Dickinson & Gillette, 1993).
Equally divided group incentives versus individual incentives. Seven studies
have compared the effects o f equally divided group incentives and individual
incentives on performance (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al., 1997;
Roberts & Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow et al.,
2000). Five o f the studies were conducted in the laboratory and two in the work place.
With the exception of the Thurkow et al. (2000) study, the size o f the groups ranged
from two to twelve members. In the Thurkow et al. (2000) study, the size o f the group
varied from session to session. While the average group size was seven, the groups
ranged from two to twenty-four members. In all o f the studies, during the individual
incentive condition, performers received per piece incentives based on their own
performance. Dqring the group incentive condition, the performances of group
members were pooled and incentives were based on the group’s productivity. In
Thurkow et al.’s study, the top performer received an additional bonus during the
group incentive condition. However, because the additional bonus was small (one
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hour o f additional pay) in comparison to the amount o f the incentives that were
distributed equally among the members o f the group, for the purposes o f the current
review, the incentives are being classified as equally rather than differentially
divided.
In the five laboratory studies (Farr, 1976; Honeywell et a l, 1997; Roberts &
Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989), performance was
comparable when workers received equally divided group incentives and individual
incentives. In one of the two field studies (Allison et al., 1992), performance was
slightly higher when workers received equally divided group incentives. Thus, in six
o f the seven studies, the small group incentives were at least as effective as individual
incentives.
The results reported by Thurkow et al. (2000) differ. In their study, the
performance o f telephone interviewers was considerably better when they were paid
individual incentives than when they received equally divided group incentives. The
reason the results differ from the results o f the prior studies is unclear. One possibility
is the lack o f a clear performance standard during the group incentive condition.
During that condition, workers earned incentives when the group’s performance
exceeded a specified standard. The group standard was calculated by multiplying an
hourly goal by the number o f person-hours for the shift. The group standard was very
difficult for the supervisor to determine because interviewers failed to report for
scheduled shifts, were tardy, or attended shifts for which they were not scheduled.
According to the authors, “Therefore, it was difficult for the supervisors to give the
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interviewers an accurate goal during the shift because it was hard to estimate the final
person-hours and this finstrated the interviewers” (p. 18). It may have suppressed
their performance as well. There are other possible reasons for the discrepant results,
including the size o f the group. The results o f the study were based on the
performance o f six participants; however, the participants were part of different sized
groups fi-om day to day, depending upon how many other employees were scheduled
to work. As indicated earlier, while the average size o f the work group was seven
members, the size o f the work group varied from two to twenty-four members.
Results from the other studies suggest that group incentives are as effective as
individual incentives for groups ranging in size from two to twelve members.
Findings from studies by Campbell (1952) and Marriott (1949) also suggest that the
effectiveness o f group incentives decreases for larger groups. Thus, in Thurkow et
al.’s study, the size o f the group, its uncertainty, and/or the instability o f the particular
individuals who comprised the group from session to session could explain the
superiority o f individual incentives. Finally, the six participants typically performed
higher than other members o f their groups (Thurkow et al., 2000). Thus, the authors
suggested, based on analyses by Dierks and McNally (1989) and Dickinson and
Honeywell-Johnson (1999), that the participants may have decreased their
performance during the group incentive condition because they received less money
in incentives.
Four o f the 7 studies comparing equally divided group incentives and
individual incentives reported satisfaction data. Satisfaction ratings from three o f the
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four studies indicated that participants were equally satisfied with group and
individual monetary incentives (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al.,
1997). In addition to asking workers to rate the pay systems in terms of satisfaction,
Allison et al. (1992) also asked them to choose the pay system they wanted to work
under during the last week o f the study. The twelve staff members voted privately and
were told that a simple majority would be used to determine which pay system would
be implemented. In spite o f the fact that staff rated the group and individual incentive
systems similarly with respect to satisfection, they unanimously voted for the equally
divided group incentives. Thus, in the preceding three studies, participants were
equally satisfied with or preferred group monetary incentives. In contrast, Thurkow et
al.’s (2000) participants preferred individual incentives. If Thurkow et a l’s
participants were indeed high performers as the authors proposed, then these latter
data would be consistent with preference data from the Honeywell et al. (1997) study.
In that study, although high performers rated the two types o f pay systems similarly,
all o f the top performers preferred individual incentives when they were asked to
choose between them.
In summary, in six o f the seven studies, equally divided small group
incentives were found to be at least as effective as individual incentives for groups
ranging in size from two to twelve members. In three o f the four studies that assessed
satisfaction and/or preference, participants were equally or more satisfied with the
group incentives than with individual incentives. The results from Thurkow et al.
(2000) differed with respect to both performance and satisfaction. As indicated above,
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there are several reasons why Thurkow et al.’s findings may have differed from the
findings of the other studies, including (a) the lack o f a clear group goal during the
group incentive condition, (b) the size o f the payout group, (c) the changing
membership o f the group, and (d) the possibility that the participants were high
performers in comparison to the other workers.
Differentially divided group incentives versus individual incentives. Three
studies compared the effects o f differentially divided group incentives and individual
incentives (Allison et al. 1992; Farr, 1976; Thurkow et al. 2000). The results o f the
preceding studies differ. Farr (1976) found performance to be higher when
participants received differentially divided incentives than when they received
individual incentives, Allison et al. (1992) found performance to be comparable, and
Thurkow et al. (2000) found performance to be lower when participants received
competitive incentives. Although satisfaction ratings were comparable for the group
and individual monetary incentives in two o f the studies (Allison et al., 1992; Farr,
1976), Farr’s participants indicated that the group incentives were less fair. Thurkow
et al.’s participants overwhelmingly preferred individual incentives over the
competitive group incentives.
The competitive incentive systems in the three studies were very different, and
thus it is not surprising that the results differed. Further research is required to
determine the relative effectiveness o f differentially divided group incentives and
individual incentives and the parameters that may make one more effective than the
other. However, as mentioned earlier, competitive rewards may have long-term
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deleterious effects as workers vie for the limited rewards. Because o f this, a number
o f individuals have argued against their use in work settings (Daniels, 1994;
Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).
The Effects o f Small Group Incentives on High Performance
Two studies have investigated the effects o f group monetary incentives on
high performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977). This
topic o f research is important for several reasons. As indicated earlier, many
compensation experts have argued that the performance o f individuals is likely to be
lower when they are paid group incentives than when they are paid individual
incentives (Blinder, 1990; Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Dierks & McNally, 1987;
Lawler, 1990). However, as also discussed earlier, in six o f seven studies, equally
divided group incentives were just as effective as individual incentives with groups
ranging in size from two to twelve members (Allison et al., 1992; Farr, 1976;
Honeywell et al., 1997; Roberts & Leary, 1990; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman &
Dickinson, 1989). Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999) stated that these results
may have been due to the feet that individuals within the group performed similarly to
one another. If participants within a group perform similarly, the amount o f pay they
receive under individual and group incentives does not vary much (Dickinson, 2000).
If pay does not vary, the monetary contingencies are essentially the same for the
performer and thus one would not expect performance to vary. Rather, “decreases in
group productivity are most likely to result when high performers earn less money
when paid group incentives and lower their performance accordingly over time”
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(Dickinson, 2000, p. 5). Dickinson’s statement was based on an analysis originally
provided by Dierks and McNally (1989) who argued against group incentive systems
on the grounds that high performers would decrease their performance when they saw
their earnings repeatedly decreased by other workers.
The preceding analyses suggest that individual and group monetary incentive
systems are likely to result in comparable performance levels when members within
the group perform similarly to one another. If members perform differently, group
incentives are likely to decrease the performance o f the high performers and hence
the productivity o f the entire work group.
The effects o f group incentives on high performance are important from a
business perspective. As indicated earlier, surveys conducted over the past decade
indicate that approximately 12% - 16% o f organizations currently use small group
incentives (Honeywell et al., 1997). In some manufacturing industries, 50% o f
employees are covered by group plans (Peterson, 1992). In addition, surveys
conducted in the mid-1990s indicate that the use of small group incentives is
increasing (Gross, 1995; Ledford & Hawk, 2000). In 1996, based on the survey data
as well as the increasing trend for organizations to adopt team work structures,
Flannery et al. (1996) predicted that the use o f group monetary incentives would
increase significantly. Given the increasing use o f group incentives, organizations
would benefit from knowing whether equally divided group incentives result in lower
levels of productivity than individual incentives. If, indeed, performance levels o f
high performers decrease, organizations might want to consider using individual
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incentives, if and when possible. While companies could also consider using
differentially divided group incentives, as indicated earlier, they may generate
counterproductive competitive behaviors.
As presented earlier, seven studies compared the differential effects o f equally
divided and individual incentives. In all but one (Thurkow et al., 2000), individuals
performed comparably when they were paid individual incentives and when they
were paid group incentives. Four o f the studies included the individual performance
data that are necessary to determine whether members o f the group performed
similarly to one another (Honeywell et al., 1997; Smoot, 1997; Stoneman &
Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow et al., 2000). The other three reported only group data
(Allison et a l, 1992; Farr, 1976; Roberts & Leary, 1990). The four that provided
individual data will be discussed next, to explore Dickinson’s (2000) contention that
if performers within a group perform similarly, performance is likely to be the same
under individual and group incentives.
Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) examined groups ranging in size from two to
nine members. Participants performed comparably when paid group and individual
incentives. The authors reported that there was a clear top performer in four of the
eight groups (Group A, N=2; Group C, N=2; Group G, N=4; and Group F, N=5). The
authors do not report their criterion for determining what was considered high
performance and it would appear that this assertion was based on a visual inspection
o f the data. In three o f these cases (Group C, N=2; Group G, N=4; and Group F,
N=5), the performance o f the top performer was not significantly different under
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group and individual incentives (again, this assertion appears to be based on visual
inspection), although high performers earned, on average, $.49 less per session during
the group incentive phase. In the fourth group (Group A, N=2), both participants
performed comparably during the first individual incentive condition. During the
group incentive condition, the performance o f both participants dropped, with
Participant 2 emerging as a high performer (based on visual inspection) during this
phase. Both participants earned less money during the group incentive phase than
they had during the individual phase. When reversed to individual incentives, the
performance o f the lower performer remained low, but the performance o f the high
performer increased to previously higher levels. These results (aside from the
performance o f the high performer in Group A) appear to contradict Dickinson’s
(2000) contention that high performers will decrease their performance over time
when paid group incentives. Stoneman and Dickinson (1989) note, however, that
participants were paid only once at the end o f the group incentive phase and that pay
decreases resulting from the group contingencies may not have been salient enough to
affect performance. Additionally, the authors note that in very small groups in which
overall pay is highly contingent on individual performances, high performers may
behave according to self-generated rules stating that any decreases in their
performance will further decrease their earnings.
Smoot (1997) examined individual and group incentives with six threemember groups, and, like Stoneman and Dickinson (1989), found performance to be
comparable when individuals received individual and group monetary incentives. The
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author o f the current paper developed an arbitrary criterion to determine whether
participants were high or low performers. Participants were classified as high
performers if their performance was 20% higher than the performance of the middle
performer diiring the individual incentive condition. According to this criterion, there
were no high performers in any o f the six groups. Because most o f the participants
performed comparably to each other within the groups, the overall results o f this
study lend support to Dickinson’s (2000) contention that if group members perform
similarly to each other, their performance is likely to be the same when they are paid
individual and group incentives.
Honeywell et al. (1997) examined two 10-person groups. As with the prior
two studies, individuals perfomied similarly when' they were paid individual and
group monetary incentives. There were high performers in that study, which, when
combined with the results o f the study, would appear to contradict Dickinson’s
contention. However, pay differences between the group and individual incentive
conditions were quite small, ranging in size from $.02 to $1.00, with a mean o f $.29
per 20-minute session. This relatively small pay difference could account for the
failure to find performance differences. Moreover, a more detailed analysis of
Honeywell’s data supports the possibility that high performers decreased their
performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002). When Honeywell et al. (1997)
statistically analyzed their data, they collapsed the data across the two groups o f
participants. When the data for the two groups were analyzed separately, however,
performance was statistically significantly lower during the group incentive
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conditions for one o f the groups. This group contained the highest performers with
the highest pay ditferentials between the individual and group incentive conditions.
These suggestive results prompted Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) to state that they
merited fiirther study.
Thurkow et al. (2000), in an appendix, reported individual and group data for
all o f their participants. In this study, individuals performed higher when they were
paid individual incentives than when they received group monetary incentives. As
noted by the authors, an analysis o f the individual performance data revealed that
their six participants performed better than the other group members in 67% o f the
sessions. Thus, the participants could be considered high performers and, as stated by
Thurkow et al., “based on Dickinson and Honeywell-Johnson (1999), would be
expected to perform lower during the group incentive sessions” (p. 19). They also
added that “Further research into this phenomenon is necessary to determine more
precisely how

high and low

producers perform aeross varying incentive

contingencies” (p. 19).
Taken together, the available data from the preceding studies provide
credibility to the suppositions that (a) equally divided and individual incentives wiU
result in similar levels o f performance if group members perform similarly to each
other (Honeywell-Johnson et a l, 2002; Smoot, 1997), and (b) group incentives may
decrease performance if there are distinct high performers in the group (HoneywellJohnson et a l, 2002; Thurkow et a l, 2000).
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As stated previously, only two experimental studies have examined the effects
o f group monetary incentives on high performance (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002;
London & Oldham, 1977). London and Oldham (1977) investigated the performance
o f 35 two-person groups. The two group members were introduced to each other and
then separated to work in different rooms. The experimental task consisted o f sorting
cards punched with holes into separate piles based on the pattern o f the holes in the
card. Participants were first exposed to an individual monetary incentive system for
one 5-minute session, during which they were paid $.01 for each card they sorted.
After participants were paid for this trial, one-half Of the participants were told that
they sorted 25% more cards than their partner, while the other half was told that they
sorted 25% fewer cards than their partner. Participants were then randomly assigned
to one o f the following five pay conditions for three 5-minute sessions: (a) fixed rate
pay, (b) the individual incentive condition or (c) one o f three group monetary
incentive systems. Seven two-person groups were thus assigned to each condition,
with one member of the group believing he or she was a high performer and the other
believing that he or she was a low performer. In all three o f the group monetary
incentive conditions, the available incentives were equally divided between the two
members. However, in one o f the group conditions, participants were told that the
incentives would be based on the performance o f the high performer, in one, they
were told that the incentives would be based on the ■performance o f the low
performer, and in the third, they were told that the incentives would be based on the
average performance o f the two. Before each o f the three 5-minute sessions.
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participants were asked to set a goal for their performance. The goal was recorded on
a progress sheet along with their past performance level and remained in view o f the
participants during the sessions.
Two sets o f results are o f interest when analyzing how individual and group
incentives' affect high performance: (a) a comparison o f the performance o f high
performers across pay conditions; and (b) a comparison o f the total productivity o f
the two-member groups across pay conditions. Participants who were told they were
high performers performed significantly better when they were paid individual
incentives than when they were paid a flat rate or group incentives. They sorted 16%
more cards when they were paid individual incentives than when they were paid
group incentives based on the average performance o f the two members (69.6 cards
versus 58.2 cards) and 27% more cards when they were paid individual incentives
than when they were paid group incentives based on either the performance o f the
high or low performer (69.6 cards versus 51.1 cards for both group conditions).
Although the authors reported that they conducted individual post-hoc statistical
comparisons between the groups, they did not indicate which specific comparisons
they conducted nor did they report the results o f most o f the analyses. They did state
that “A significant interaction emerged for the effects o f incentive plan and level o f
the other participant’s performance. . . Performance was highest when the subject
paid on the individual piece-rate basis was the higher performer and when the subject
paid on the high performance piece-rate basis was the low performer” (p. 38).
Nonetheless, without additional information regarding the tests they conducted, it is

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26
not possible to determine whether the comparisons presented previously were
statistically significant.
Group productivity was greatest when participants were paid individual
incentives and when they were paid group incentives based on the performance o f the
high performer. The former result is due to the high performance o f the high
performers; the latter result is due to the high performance o f the low performers. The
mean number o f cards sorted by the two group members was 128.1, 126.0, 114.7,
111.3, and 100.7 under (a) the individual incentive condition, (b) the group incentives
based on the high performer, (c) the group incentives based on the average performer,
(d) the flat rate pay, and (e) the group incentives based on the low performer,
respectively. The authors reported that the post hoc analyses demonstrated that
performance was significantly higher for the individual piece rate condition and the
group incentives based on the high performer than for the other incentive systems
taken together; that is, when the performance under the other two group incentive
systems was averaged together. No other statistical comparisons were reported. It is
likely that other comparisons were not statistically significant. However, lacking
further information about the comparisons that were made, it is unclear whether the
performance differences (a) between the individual incentives and the group
incentives based on the average performance o f the two members or (b) between the
group incentives based on the high performer and the group incentives based on the
average performance were statistically significant.
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Consistent with the analyses by Dickinson (2000) and Honeywell et al.
(1997), the preceding data suggest that the performance o f high performers will be
better when they are paid individual incentives than when they are paid equally
divided group incentives.
Although the results o f London and Oldham are suggestive, they are not
definitive due to (a) the lack o f clarity regarding the statistical analyses and (b) the
goal-setting confoimd. Moreover, the groups consisted o f only two members.
Different results may occur with larger groups.
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) examined the effects o f individual and group
incentives on the performance o f high performers, using a within-subject reversal
design. Participants were four college students who performed a computerized work
task, SYNWORK (Elsmore, 1994), on networked computers. The experimental
design was an ABCB reversal design, with A = hourly pay with individual feedback,
B = individual incentives with individual feedback, and C = group incentives with
group feedback. Each session was two hours and each phase lasted between 5-10
sessions. Alternative tasks (email and computer games) were available on adjacent
computers and participants could engage in those activities whenever they wanted. In
addition, the experimenter prompted participants to take three 5-minute work breaks
during the session.
During the hourly pay condition, participants earned $10.00 per session.
During the individual and group incentive conditions, the amount o f money they
received was based on the number o f points they earned each session. In the
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individual incentive condition, participants received $.10 for every 100 points earned.
At the end o f each session, the computer displayed the number o f points earned. In
the group incentive condition, participants were told that they were members of a tenperson group and that their incentives would be based on the average performance o f
the group members. Participants received $.10 for every 100 points in the group
average. The groups were simulated; that is, the point score o f each participant was
averaged with a predetermined score based on the performance o f pilot participants,
not with the scores o f nine other current group members as the participants were told.
The predetermined score was used to ensure that the participants would indeed be
“high performers.” The predetermined score was based on a simulated point score of
11,400 per group member. This score was the score that was “1.5 standard deviations
below the average performance o f pilot subjects who were paid in dividual incentives
when perfbrming SYNWORK” (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002, p. 94). To
determine the group average, (a) 11,400 was first multiplied by nine (to represent the
total number o f points earned by the other nine members o f the group), (b) then the
product, 102,600, was added to the participant’s session point score, and (c) the
resulting sum was divided by 10. Thus, if a participant earned 15,000 points during a
session, his or her incentives would have been based on the “group average” o f
11,760 points [(102,600 + 15,000)710]. All four participants earned more than 11,400
points in each session and thus were true high performers in comparison to the
predetermined score. In addition, because the participants performed above the
predetermined score, the “group’s” average scores were always lower than their
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individual scores and they earned less money than they did during the individual
incentive phases. During the group incentive condition, the computer displayed the
average group score at the end o f each session. The individual’s point score was not
displayed during this condition. In a post-experimental questionnaire, all four
participants indicated they believed their performance was combined with the
performance o f nine other group members during the group incentive condition.
The performance of all four participants was significantly higher during the
individual incentive conditions than during the hourly pay condition. Three o f the
four participants performed lower during the group incentive condition than during
the individual monetary incentive condition, earning 16%, 14% and 12% fewer
points. During the individual and group pay conditions, respectively, Participant 2
earned an average o f 13,070 points versus 10,860 points, Participant 1 earned an
average of 12,885 points versus 11,094 points, and Participant 4 earned an average of
12,939 points versus 11,447 points. The performance o f the fourth participant in the
study increased throughout the study, regardless Of pay condition.
In a post-experimental questionnaire, Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) also
assessed participant satisfaction and preference for the three pay systems. All four
participants indicated that they preferred the individual incentives and found them to
be more satisfying than either hourly pay or group incentives. Three o f the four
reported that the group incentive system was the most stressful.
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) concluded that the group incentives resulted
in lower performance than the individual incentives, stating, “these data indicate that
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high performers are likely to decrease their performance when they are paid small
group monetary incentives” (p. 100). The results also suggest that top performers
prefer individual incentives and find group incentives to be more stressful than either
hourly pay or individual incentives.
While the results o f the studies conducted by London and Oldham (1997) and
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002) are compelling, they are limited. As indicated
earlier, the results reported by London and Oldham are problematic due to (a) the lack
of clarity with respect to the statistical comparisons and (b) the confound due to the
goal-setting intervention. In addition, they examined groups with only two members
while in lousiness and industry, group incentives are most commonly implemented
with groups o f ten members (Honeywell et al., 1997). Finally, participants were
exposed (o the pay conditions for only three 5-minute sessions. The need for
experiments consisting o f multiple sessions per condition, rather than one to three, is
generally accepted within the field o f behavior analysis. For example, Johnston and
Pennypacker (1993) stated that “observing the behavior o f a single subject repeatedly
under a constant set o f conditions gives the experimenter the opportunity to obtain a
complete and clear picture o f the effects o f that condition on behavior” (p. 198). It is
risky to make conclusions about the effects o f group incentives on performance given
the number and length o f those sessions.
McGee (2003), in an unpublished thesis, extended the work o f London and
Oldham (1977) and Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002). McGee's (2003) study
examined the effects o f individual and group monetary incentives on the performance
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o f high agd low performers. Participants were six college students who performed a
computerized work task called SYNWIN (2000), which is an updated version o f the
task used by HoneyweU-Johnson et al. (2002). The SYNWIN (2000) program
consisted o f four sub-tasks, each presented in a separate quadrant o f the computer
screen: a memory task, an arithmetic task, a visual monitoring task, and an auditory
monitoring task. Participants earned points for correct responses and lost points for
incorrect responses. The primary dependent variables were the total number o f points
earned per session and the percent correct per session.
An ABAC within-subject reversal design was used, where A = individual
incentives, B = group incentives (either high or low performance), and C = hourly
pay. Each participant was exposed to individual monetary incentives, simulated group
(n = 10) monetary incentives and hourly pay. The participants worked individually
under all pay systems, but during the group pay condition they were told that their
pay was based on the average performance o f a ten-person group. During the group
monetary incentive condition, participants were exposed to either a “high
performance” condition or a “low performance” condition. The assignments to the
“high performance” and “low performance” conditions were based on the
performance o f participants after the first individual incentive condition session. The
participants who had the highest cumulative point scores were assigned to the “high
performance” condition. The participants who had the lowest cumulative point scores
were assigned to the “low performance” condition. The performance average o f the
simulated group was manipulated according to the performance level (high or low) to
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which the participant was assigned. The simulated group average was based on the
average performance o f the participant during the individual incentive phase, which
preceded t)ie group monetary incentive phase. The calculations used to determine
high and low performance insured that the performance o f the nine other group
members was either 20% higher or 20% lower than the average performance of the
participant during the final three sessions o f the individual monetary incentive
conditioiL
The point scores o f all six participants decreased when group incentives were
in effect, but failed to increase to previously higher levels for all hut two participants
during the second individual incentive condition. The point scores o f all participants
were lowest during the hourly pay condition. The data were highly variable for the
majority o f participants, particularly during the second individual incentive condition.
During debriefing, these participants indicated that their performance had been
affected because the task, specifically the auditory monitoring sub-task, had become
aversive over time and because the 90-minute sessions were too long. Due to this
variability, no distinct conclusions could be drawn about the effects o f individual and
group monetary incentives on the performance levels of high and low performers.
The current study extended the work o f London and Oldham (1977),
Honeywell-Johnson et al. (2002), and McGee (2003). It examined how group and
individual incentives affected high performance across multiple sessions using
simulated groups o f 10 members. Once again, a single subject reversal design was
used in order to assess the effects o f individual and group incentives on the
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performance of individuals, not on the performance o f groups o f individuals. In
response to the problems that arose with the experimental task used in the McGee
(2003) study, a computer task that simulated the job o f a bank proof operator replaced
the use o f SYNWIN (2000), and session length was 45 minutes rather than 90
minutes. Finally, this study eliminated a confound in the previous studies. In all prior
studies (Honeywell et al., 2002; London & Oldham, 1977; McGee, 2003),
participants were first exposed to individual incentive pay without group comparative
feedback, then exposed to group incentive pay with such comparative feedback. Thus,
the comparative feedback, the group incentive pay, or a combination o f both may
have contributed to the observed differences in performance under the individual
incentive pay condition and the group incentive pay condition. In the current study,
the effects o f individual incentive pay with individual and group feedback were
compared to the effects of group incentive pay with individual and group feedback.
By holding the comparative group feedback constant across the two individual and
group incentive conditions, any performance differences that occurred could be
attributed to the pay system itself, rather than to the comparative feedback indicating
that the participant was a high performer.
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Method
Participants
Participants were 11 college students (see Appendix A for the recruitment
script). Participants were screened according to three criteria. First, because the
experimental task required participants to use the number pad o f a computer
keyboard, only keyboard proficient participants were included. The criterion for
computer keyboard proficiency was 750 checks correctly processed in 45 minutes.
This criterion was based on the average performance o f three high performers who
performed the same task during a pilot study. Second, only participants who self
reported that they played computer games (the alternative ofF-task activities in the
study) at least once a week were included (see Appendix B for the screening
questionnaire). Third, after the experimenter had explained the pay systems that were
to be used in the study, participants were required to score 100% on a quiz that tested
their imderstanding o f them (see Appendix C for the quiz). Only participants who
signed an informed consent form approved by Western Michigan University’s Human
Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) were included in the study. The consent
form is provided in Appendix D and the HSIRB research approval letter is provided
in Appendix E.
Setting
Sessions were conducted in an on-campus laboratory located in 2532 Wood
Hall. The laboratory contained 3 Dell computers. The computers were connected
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through a Local Area Network (LAN). Each participant had a work area consisting of
an adjustable chair, computer, keyboard, mouse, and gel palm rest.
Apparatus/Materials
Participants performed a computer task that simulated the job o f a bank proof
operator. Simulated bank checks, ranging in value from $10.00 to $999.99, were
presented on the computer screen (see Appendix F). Participants entered the cash
values in a cell at the bottom o f the computer screen, using the computer’s numeric
keypad. When the participant had entered the number, he/she pressed the enter key to
complete the transaction and move on to the next check. During every session,
participants had access to computer games. Participants were allowed to minimize
(but not close) the task program at any time to play any o f several popular computer
games (Freecell, Hearts, Minesweeper, Pinball, Solitaire, Spider Solitaire, and Tetris).
These alternative tasks were necessary because without them participants may have
spent all o f their time performing the experimental task because they had nothing else
to do, which could have eliminated any performance differences under the three pay
systems due to differences in the amount o f time spent off-task.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variables were the total number o f checks correctly
completed per session, the average rate (number o f checks correctly completed per
minute spent performing the task) per session, the percentage correct per session, and
time spent performing the work task (as opposed to the computer games). The
computer program automatically recorded the total number o f checks completed, the
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number o f checks completed correctly and the number completed incorrectly, and the
amount o f time spent olBf-task. The computer began to record time as oif task when
the participant had not entered a value in the check program for 10 seconds, and
continued to record the time as off task until the participant again entered a value in
the check program. The off-task time was then totaled for the 4 5-minute session.
The total number o f checks completed, the number completed correctly and
incorrectly, and the total amount o f time spent off-task were used to compute (a) the
rate o f correct check completion, (b) the percentage correct, and (c) the time spent
performing the work task. The experimenter tested the computer program before the
first session each week to insure that it was accurately recording these data. All data
were manually recorded on a data sheet after each session as well as saved to a back
up file (see Appendix G). These precautionary steps were taken to insure that data
were not lost due to a computer or disk malfunction.
In addition to the preceding dependent variables, at the end o f the study,
participants were asked to indicate which o f the three pay systems they preferred,
found least stressful, and found most satisfying. The questionnaire is provided in
Appendix H.
Experimental Design
A within-suhject reversal design was used. Each participant was exposed to
(a) hourly pay with individual feedback, (b) individual incentive pay with individual
feedback, (c) individual incentive pay with individual and group feedback, and (d)
group incentive pay with individual and group feedback. The sequence o f exposure
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was ABCDC, where A = hourly pay with individual feedback, B = individual
incentive pay with individual feedback, C == individual incentive pay with individual
and group feedback, and D = group incentive pay with individual and group
feedback.
Participants worked individually under all pay conditions, but during the
group incentive pay condition they were told that their pay was based on the average
performance o f a ten-person group. However, the group was simulated. Simulated
group procedures have been used successfully in a number o f previous research
studies (e.g., Harcum & Badura, 1990; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Kerr &
Bruun, 1983; Szymanski & Harkins, 1987; White, Kjelgaard, & Harkins, 1995).
The first two phases (AB), hourly pay with individual feedback and individual
monetary incentive pay with individual feedback, were included to insure that
monetary incentives increased the performance o f the participants. Without such a
demonstration, it is not possible to validly compare the effects o f two different
incentive pay systems (in this case individual incentives and group incentives) on
performance. In addition, the inclusion o f the first individual incentive pay condition
enabled the participant’s performance to stabilize under individual incentives. This
stabilization was necessary in order to determine the group feedback that would be
provided to participants in the next three phases.
During the last three phases (CDC), participants were given both individual
and group feedback. The performance o f the simulated group was contrived so that it
was approximately 25% lower than the participant’s performance. This ensured that
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all participants were high performers, and hence would receive less pay during the
group mcentive condition (D) than during the individual incentive condition (C) for
comparable levels o f performance. The specific method for calculating the contrived
group performance is described in the Independent Variable section.
The inclusion o f both individual and group feedback during the last three
phases o f the study (CDC) controlled for the fact that a participant may have
performed more poorly under the group incentive condition simply because o f the
comparative feedback indicating that he/she was a high performer, and not
necessarily because the participant received less pay for comparable levels of
performance. By holding this information constant across the individual and group
incentive conditions, any performance differences that occurred could be attributed to
the pay system itself, rather than the participant’s awareness that he/she was a high
performer.
Experimental sessions were 45 minutes. There was a minimum o f five
sessions per phase. If performance was not stable after five sessions, the phase was
extended imtil the performance o f the participant was stable or until the participant
had completed 10 sessions (for economic reasons, phases could not be extended
beyond 10 sessions, although there were some exceptions made). Performance was
considered stable when the cumulative number o f checks correctly processed per
session across three sessions was within a range o f + or - 10% for each o f the three
sessions.
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Independent Variable
Hourly Pay with Individual Feedback Condition
During the hourly pay with individual feedback condition, participants were
paid $5.75 for each 45-minute session if they correctly completed at least 490 checks.
This minimum decreased the likelihood that participants would not perform the task
at all. In work settings, employees must perform at ininimum levels to avoid
supervisory criticism and being fired. This minimum requirement was designed to
simulate that contingency. The 490-check minimum was one standard deviation
below the average performance o f pilot participants working under an hourly pay
with individual feedback condition.
Before each session, participants were given a receipt that indicated the total
number of correctly processed checks and the amount o f money they earned in the
preceding session. The receipt that was given to participants is provided in Appendix
I. Receipts were given to participants before they began their next session rather than
immediately after each session because if participants received feedback immediately
after the sessions during the individual and simulated group incentive conditions in
which they received both individual and group feedback, it would decrease the
likelihood that they would believe that their performance was being combined with
the performance o f nine other individuals. In order to control for potential confounds
due to the timing o f the feedback, the same feedback procedure was used in all pay
conditions.
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The feedback script that was used in this and all other conditions can be found
in Appendix J. To further standardize procedures across phases, in all experimental
conditions participants were paid in cash before their first session o f the week or
immediately before the first session o f a new pay phase.
Individual Incentive Pay with In d ivid u a l F eed b a ck C ondition
Participants were paid on a piece-rate pay system in which they earned $.006
per check processed correctly. Participants earned approximately $5.75, an amount
comparable to base pay, if they processed at least 958 checks per session. This
equivalency was based on the average performance o f pilot participants who were
paid individual incentives with individual feedback and adjusted slightly based on the
initial performance o f the current participants. Participants who processed more than
958 checks earned more money because o f the incentive pay.
As in the hourly pay with individual feedback condition, before each session,
participants were given a receipt that indicated the total number o f correctly
processed checks and the amount o f money they earned in the preceding session
(Appendix I), and were paid in cash before their first session o f the week or
immediately before the first session o f a new pay phase.
Individual In centive P a y with In d ivid u a l a n d G roup F e e d b a ck C ondition

As in the individual incentive with individual feedback condition, participants
earned $.006 per check processed correctly. Before each session, participants were
given a receipt that indicated (a) the total number o f correctly processed checks by the
participant, (b) the average number o f correctly processed checks by the simulated
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group, and (c) the amount of money they earned in the preceding session. The receipt
is provided in Appendix K.
The group average was set at approximately 25% (with a range o f 23-27%,
randomly determined in advance) below the mean performance of the participant. The
following formula was used to determine the group average in each session:
[(approximately .75 x mean performance o f the last three stable sessions in the
individual incentive pay with individual feedback phase x 9) + the participant’s
current session performance] /10. Ensuring that the group average was lower than the
individual’s performance by approximately 25% controlled for the fact that the extent
to which an individual’s performance differs from the group’s performance may
affect the individual’s performance when he/she is given group feedback and paid
group monetary incentives.
As in all experimental conditions, participants were paid in cash before their
first session o f the week or immediately before the fast session o f a new pay phase.
G roup Incentive P a y w ith Individual a n d G roup F e e d b a ck C ondition

During the group incentive pay with individual and group feedback condition,
the pay earned by each participant was based on the average performance o f the
simulated group. Similar to the individual incentive conditions, participants received
$.006 per correctly processed check in the group average. Thus, the participants
earned approximately $5.75 per session if the group average was 958 checks.
As in the individual incentive pay with individual and group feedback
condition, before each session, participants were given a receipt that indicated (a) the
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total number o f correctly processed checks by the participant, (b) the average number
o f correctly processed checks by the simulated group, and (c) the amount o f money
they earned in the preceding session (Appendix K). The formula that was used to
determine the simulated group’s average performance was the same one that was
described in the preceding section. As in all experimental conditions, participants
were paid in cash before their first session o f the week or immediately before the first
session of a new pay phase.
Integrity o f the Independent Variable
To insure that the experimenter was correctly implementing the pay systems,
the descriptions o f the pay systems and the feedback provided during each pay
condition were scripted. The experimenter read the scripted description o f the pay
system in effect to participants before each session began. Also, the experimenter
read Jfom a feedback script when providing participants with their scores for the
preceding session. These scripts are provided in Appendix J.
The computer program automatically recorded participants’ data (see
Dependent Variables section). To insure the program was accurately recording the
data, the experimenter calibrated the computer program before the first session each
week. Accurately recorded data are crucial, for without them, participants would not
receive the correct pay. To insure correct payment, during the individual incentive
condition, the experimenter compared the participants’ number o f correctly processed
checks, recorded by the computer program, to a pay chart indicating the amount o f
pay the participants should receive based on their performance (see Appendix L).
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During the group incentive condition, the experimenter computed the amount o f pay
the participants should receive by entering the participants’ number o f correctly
processed checks, recorded by the computer program, into a mathematical formula,
described in the Individual Incentive Pay with Individual and Group Feedback
Condition section that resulted in the simulated group’s average performance. The
experimenter compared this performance to the pay chart to determine the amount o f
pay the participants should receive. Additionally, a second experimenter checked the
formula and pay for 20% o f the sessions. Interobserver agreement was calculated as
the number o f agreements divided by the number o f agreements plus disagreements,
and equalled 93.75%.
Experimental Procedure
Introductory Session
Potential participants were screened using the criteria described in the
Participants section. Candidates who met the inclusion criteria were asked to
participate in the study and scheduled for experimental sessions. They were asked to
schedule at least three sessions per week. Participants were paid $5.75 for attending
the introductory session, and were paid immediately following the session.
Experimental Sessions
Before beginning the study, all participants were informed o f the different pay
systems to be used during the sessions. The experimenter explained how to minimize
and maximize the computer program and computer games. Additionally, laminated,
fiill-color job aids for playing each of the games were located by the participants’
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workstation. If it was the first session o f the week or the first session o f a condition
(excluding the first session o f the hourly pay condition), the participants were paid.
Before the first session of each pay condition, participants were told which pay
system was in elfect and how they would be paid (i.e., during individual incentive
pay conditions they were told that they would be paid $.006 for every check they
correctly processed). Also, before each session within the pay phase, the participants
were reminded o f the pay system that was in effect for that session. The experimenter
also reminded them that they were ifree to take work breaks whenever they desired,
and that computer games were available on the computer (Appendix J).
The experimenter was not present in the computer laboratory during sessions.
The reason for this was to control for reactivity to the experimenter.

That is,

participants may have been less likely to engage in off task activities if the
experimenter was present (Matthews & Dickinson, 2000). After 45 minutes had
elapsed, the experimenter entered the room, ended the sessions, thanked the
participants for their time, and reminded them o f their next session dates/times.
Debriefing Session
Upon completion o f the last phase, each participant was asked to schedule a
debriefing session. When the debriefing session began, the participants were asked to
complete the Satisfaction and Stress Level Questionnaire (Appendix G). After
participants completed the questionnaire, the experimenter explained the purpose o f
the study (see Appendix M) and answered participants’ questions.
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Results
Task Performance
Total Number o f Checks Correctly Processed
Table 1 displays the average number o f correctly processed checks per phase
by each participant.
Table 1
Average Number o f Correctly Processed Checks Completed by Each Participant in
Each Condition

p#

Hr Pay
IF

In Inc
IF

In Inc
IF+GF

Grp Inc
IF+GF

In Inc
IF+GF

20

663 (148.4)

773 (83.3)

835 (117.0)

706 (98.0)

838 (55.7)

21

918(56.9)

1034(21.0)

1061 (49.4)

969 (65.2)

1069 (71.3)

22

822 (82.3)

1048(152.8)

1201 (42.8)

1197(55.0)

1324 (35.0)

23

800(151.4)

1082 (64.6)

962 (171.4)

842 (71.7)

805 (104.6)

25

975 (64.8)

1156(41.3)

1194(64.7)

1180 (54.7)

1225 (22.3)

26

895 (87.1)

1087 (38.4)

1086 (18.3)

986 (139.4)

1232 (42.3)

27

860 (87.8)

966 (149.4)

1037 (18.0)

1077 (83.1)

1095 (62.2)

28

865 (38.8)

1040 (62.1)

916 (45.2)

819(34.9)

823 (112.7)

29

812 (53.8)

1089 (66.7)

1179(33.4)

1108(66.9)

1201 (77.9)

30

748 (103.0)

885 (44.4)

899 (63.9)

985 (47.5)

886 (143.6)

1146(33.6)
952 (58.9) , 1028 (132.9)
1074 (75.7)
1104(13.8)
M =1059
M -8 4 6
M = 1017
M -1 0 4 3
M = 995
Note: IF = individual feedback. GF = group feedback. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
31

As can be seen in Table 1, all participants performed higher during the
individual incentive with individual feedback phase (B) than during the hourly pay
with individual feedback phase (A). These results indicate that the monetary
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incentives controlled performance effectively, enabling a valid comparison between
the individual incentive with individual and group feedback condition (C) and the
group monetary incentive with individual and group feedback condition (D). The
performance patterns o f participants differed across the subsequent three phases o f
the study (C, D, and C). The individual data are, therefore, presented in groups
according to performance patterns observed across subjects.
Figure 1 displays the average performance of the participants, as a group,
across phases. The average performance o f the participants was higher during all o f
the incentive conditions (B, C, D, and C) than it was during the hourly pay condition
(A). Additionally, the average performance o f the group decreased slightly during the
group incentive condition as compared to the individual incentive conditions.
Average Number o f Correctly Processed Checks Completed by
Participants in Each Phase
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Figure 1. Group average overall task performance across phases.
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Figures 2 and 3 display the total number o f correctly processed checks per
session by the four participants whose performance decreased during the group
monetary incentives condition and increased when reversed to individual monetary
incentives. Figure 4 displays the total number o f correctly processed checks per
session by the two participants whose performance decreased during the group
monetary incentives condition but foiled to increase when reversed to individual
monetary incentives. Figures 5 and 6 display the total number o f correctly processed
checks per session by the four participants whose performance was comparable
during the two pay conditions. Figure 7 displays the total number o f correctly
processed checks per session by the one participant whose performance increased
during the group monetary incentives condition.
Performance was considered to have increased or decreased during a phase
based on visual inspection as well as whether the average performance across phases
varied by at least fifty checks (a difference in pay o f $.30). Each performance group
will be discussed in turn.
Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition and increased when reversed to individual monetary incentives.
Participants 20, 21, 26, and 29 exhibited similar trends in performance across phases
(Figures 2 and 3). All four participants’ performance increased during the individual
incentives with individual feedback condition (B). When switched to the individual
incentives with individual and group feedback condition (C), the performance levels
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Figure 2. Total number o f checks correctly processed per session by participants
whose performance decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and
increased when reversed to individual monetary incentives (P20 and P21).
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Figure 3. Total number o f checks correctly processed per session by participants
whose performance decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and
increased when reversed to individual monetary incentives (P26 and P29).
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o f P21 and P26 remained the same, while the performance levels o f P20 and P29
increased slightly. The performance o f all four participants decreased during the
group incentives with individual and group feedback condition (D). This decrease is
most notable for P26. Performance levels o f all four participants increased to
previously higher levels when reversed to the individual incentives with individual
and group feedback condition (C). For P26, this increase surpassed previous levels o f
performance under the first two individual incentive conditions.
Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition, but failed to increase when reversed to individual monetary
incentives. Participants 23 and 28 both demonstrated increases in performance when
switched trom the hourly pay with individual feedback condition (A) to the individual
incentives with individual feedback condition (B) (Figure 4). Both participants’
performance decreased during the individual incentives with individual and group
feedback (C), although P23’s performance recovered toward the end o f the phase.
Similarly, both participants’ performance decreased even further when switched to
the group incentives with individual and group feedback condition (D). However,
performance did not increase to previously higher levels for either participant when
reversed to individual incentives.
Participants whose performance was comparable during the individual
incentives and group incentives with individual and group feedback conditions.
Participants 22, 25, 27, and 31 exhibited similar trends in performance across phases
(Figures 5 and 6). All four participants’ performance increased during the first
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Figure 4. Total number of checks correctly processed per session by participants
whose performance decreased during the group monetary incentives condition, but
felled to increase when reversed to individual monetary incentives.
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Figure 5.

Total number o f checks correctly processed per session by participants

whose performance was comparable during the individual incentives and group
incentives with individual and group feedback conditions (P22 and P25).
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Figure 6. Total number o f checks correctly processed per session by participants
whose performance was comparable during the individual incentives and group
incentives with individual and group feedback conditions (P27 and P31).
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individual incentive condition (B). The participants continued to perform at the same
levels when switched to the second individual incentive condition (C) and their
performance was relatively stable throughout this condition. For all four participants,
performance foiled to decrease during the group incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (D). Performance levels stayed the same when reversed to
individual incentives with individual and group feedback (C) for three o f the four
participants (F25, P27, and P31). However, when reversed to individual incentives
with individual and group feedback (C), P22’s performance increased to even higher
levels.
Participant whose performance increased during the group monetary
incentives condition. Participant 30’s performance increased when switched from the
hourly pay with individual feedback condition (A) to the individual incentives with
individual feedback condition (B) (Figure 7). This participant’s performance
remained at approximately the same level during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (C), and then increased when switched to the
group incentives with individual and group feedback condition (D). Upon reversal to
individual incentives with individual and group feedback (C), P30’s performance
decreased to previously lower levels, but recovered during the final three sessions.
Rate
Table 2 displays the average rate o f check completion per phase for each
participant. Rate was computed as the total number o f correctly processed checks per
minute spent on task.
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Figure 7. Total number o f checks correctly processed per session by the participant
whose performance increased during the group monetary incentives condition.
Table 2
Average Rate for Each Participant in Each Condition
Hr Pay
IF
20
23.47(3.3)
21
21.53 (0.5)
22 . 25.82 (1.1)
23
22.09 (2.9)
25
22.90 (1.6)
21.36(1.1)
26
27
20.47 (1.2)
19.55 (0.9)
28
29
20.85 (2.0)
19.41 (1.5)
30
31
21.20(1.3)
M = 21.70
Note: IF = individual
parentheses.
P#

Grp Inc
In Inc
In Inc
In Inc
IF
IF+GF
IF+GF
IF+GF
23.15(1.2)
22.83 (1.2)
21.32(1.5)
24.46 (0.6)
23.50 (0.4)
24.46(1.0)
23.90(1.4)
24.86(1.4)
26.95 (1.2)
27.90 (0.8)
27.61 (1.0)
30.29 (0.3)
25.42 (2.5)
26.18(0.3)
26.15(1.5)
26.12(2.1)
25.77 (0.9)
26.60 (1.4)
26.50 (1.2)
27.38 (0.6)
24.52 (0.6)
25.12 (0.5)
27.47 (0.9)
24.18(0.8)
23.59 (0.2)
24.95 (2.2)
25.69 (0.7)
22.51 (2.7)
23.27(1.3)
21.34(0.9)
19.61 (1.2)
21.14(1.8)
26.52 (1.8)
27.53 (1.1)
26.99 (0.8)
29.23 (0.7)
20.27 (0.7)
20.60 (1.2)
22.86(1.2)
20.92(1.3)
24.22 (2.8)
25.54 (0.7)
23.08 (2.9)
24.76 (0.7)
M - 24.06
M - 25.74
M = 24.57
M = 24.47
feedback. GF - group feedback. Standard deviations are in
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As can be seen in Table 2, all but one participant (P20) performed at a higher
rate during the individual incentive with individual feedback phase (B) than during
the hourly pay with individual feedback phase (A). Additionally, the majority of
participants performed at a higher rate during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback conditions (C) than during the group incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (D).
Figure 8 displays the average rate o f performance of the participants, as a
group, across phases.

Average Rate o f Performance by Participants in Each Phase

M=21.70
SD=1.1

M=24.06
SD=2.2

M=24.57
SD=2.1

M=24.47
SD=1.3

M=25.74
SENl.O

C

Phases
Figure 8. Group average rate o f performance across phases.
Similar to overall task performance, an increase in rate o f performance
between the hourly pay with individual feedback condition (A) and the individual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57
incentives with individual feedback condition (B) can be seen. Also similar to overall
task performance is the increase in rate during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (C). Unlike overall task performance,
however, rate o f performance during the group incentive condition (D) did not
decrease as compared to rate o f performance during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (C), but did increase during the reversal
phase.
Figures 9 - 1 4 show the rate o f performance per session across all phases for
all participants. For consistency, data are presented in the same groupings that were
used to display total number o f checks processed correctly. In each case, changes in
rate of performance are compared to overall changes in performance on the task. The
purpose of this is to determine whether changes in rate account, to some extent, for
overall task performance changes. Following the presentation o f rate of performance
data, accuracy on the task and time spent on task data are presented and analyzed to
determine whether changes in performance on these measures account for overall task
performance changes. Changes in overall task performance may be due to
performance changes in one or more o f these measures: rate, accuracy, or time spent
on task.
Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition and increased when reversed to individual monetary incentives.
The rate o f performance for Participants 21, 26, and 29 increased during the
individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B) (Figures 9 and 10), and
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Figure 9. Rate o f performance per session by participants whose performance
decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when
reversed to individual monetary incentives (P20 and P21).
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Figure 10. Rate o f performance per session by participants whose performance
decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when
reversed to individual monetary incentives (P26 and P29).
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increased slightly again during the individual incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (C). During the group incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (D), the rate decreased for two of these participants (P21 and
P29). The rate for all three increased when reversed to individual incentives (C). The
rate for P20 decreased slightly across the first three incentive conditions (B, C, and
D), and increased during the second individual incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (C).
The changes in the rate o f performance Ifom hourly pay with individual
feedback to individual incentive pay with individual feedback for P21, P26, and P29
could account for some o f the increases in their overall performance between these
two conditions. Similarly, the changes in the rate o f performance for three o f the four
participants (P20, P21, and P29) could account for some o f the decreases in their
overall performance between the first individual incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (C) and the group incentives with individual and group feedback
condition (D). Changes in the rate for a l four o f these participants could account for
increases in the overaU performance between the group incentives with individual and
group feedback condition (D) and the second individual incentives with individual
and group feedback condition (C). However, as previously stated, changes in
accuracy or time spent on task may also have contributed to changes in the overall
performance on the task.
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Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition, but failed to increase when reversed to individual monetary
incentives. The rate o f performance for Participants 23 and 28 increased during the
individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B) (Figure 6). Participant
23’s rate o f performance increased again toward the end o f the individual incentives
with individual and group feedback condition (C), decreased slightly during the group
incentives with individual and group feedback condition (D) (except for the second to
last data point o f this condition), and remained at this level when reversed to
individual incentives with individual and group feedback (C). Participant 28’s rate o f
performance decreased during both the individual incentives with individual and
group feedback condition (C) and the group incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (D), and became variable when reversed to the individual
incentives condition (C).
For both participants, the changes in rate o f performance may account for
some o f the changes in overall performance on the task between the hourly pay
condition and the incentive conditions. The relatively small changes in rate o f
performance for P23 in the remaining phases do not appear to account for the larger
changes seen in overall performance on the task. However, the changes in rate o f
performance for P28 do appear to account for at least some of the changes in
performance in the remaining phases, as the changes in rate mimic changes in overall
performance on the task.
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Figure 11. Rate o f performance per session by participants whose performance
decreased during the group monetary incentives condition, but failed to increase when
reversed to individual monetary incentives.
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Participants whose performance was comparable during the individual
incentives and group incentives with individual and group feedback conditions. The
rate o f performance for P22 increased slightly toward the end o f the hourly pay
condition (A), remained relatively unchanged during the next three conditions (B, C,
and D), and increased during the final individual incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (C) (Figure 12). It would appear that this increase in rate o f
performance during the last condition accounts for the slight increase in overall
performance on the task during this condition. Participants 25, 27, and 31 all showed
slight increases in rate of performance between the hourly pay condition and the
individual incentives with individual feedback condition (Figures 12 and 13). Rate o f
performance levels for all three participants then closely resemble overall changes in
performance on the task for the remaining phases, suggesting that changes in rate may
account for at least some o f these overall performance changes.
Participant whose performance increased during the group monetary
incentives condition. The rate o f performance for P30 increased throughout the hourly
pay condition (A) (Figure 14). This. does not match the participant’s overall
performance on the task during this condition (which increased during the first three
sessions, but then decreased during the remaining sessions), suggesting that either a
change in accuracy or time spent on task, was responsible for the overall change in
performance (a visual inspection o f the data suggests that the change was due to a
decrease in the amount of time spent on task). This participant’s rate of performance
remained relatively unchanged throughout the first two individual incentives
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Figure 12. Rate o f performance per session by participants whose performance was
comparable during the individual incentives and group incentives with individual and
group feedback conditions (P22 and P25).
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Figure 13. Rate o f performance per session by participants whose performance was
comparable during the individual incentives and group incentives with individual and
group feedback conditions (P27 and P31).
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conditions (B and C). Rate of performance then increased during the group incentives
with individual and group feedback condition (D), and decreased during the reversal
to individual incentives (C). This change in performance niimics the overall changes
in task performance for P30, suggesting that changes in rate were, at least in part,
responsible for overall changes in performance.

Participant 30
35 30

B

^

.1 25
20
15

D

- \ A

10
5
0
1

3

5

7

9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Sessions

Figure 14. Rate o f performance per session by the participant whose performance
increased during the group monetary incentives condition.
Percent Correct
Table 3 displays the average percent correct per phase for each participant.
The accuracy o f all participants remained high and stable across all
conditions. The fact that quality did not decrease during the monetary incentive
conditions although quantity increased may be due to the fact that a quality control
measure was included in the study. Participants were paid $.006 per correctly
processed check, rather than per check regardless o f accuracy. The average difference
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in accuracy across phases varied by less than 1% for seven o f the eleven participants
(P20, P21, P22, P23, P28, P30, and P31), less than 2% for three o f the eleven
participants (P25, P27 and P29), and less than 6% for one participant (P26).
Table 3
Average Percent Correct Earned by Each Participant in Each Condition
Hr Pay
IF
20
99.79 (0.1)
21
98.24 (0.6)
22
98.15 (0.4)
23
98.82(0.5)
97.41 (0.6)
25
26
95.84 (5.8)
27
98.27 (0.6)
28
99.05 (0.5)
29
99.42 (0.2)
30
98.74(0.5)
31
99.20 (0.3)
M = 98.45
Note: IF = individual
parentheses.
p#

In Inc
IF
99.33 (0.5)
98.10(0.7)
97.95 (0.4)
98.75 (0.4)
97.21 (0.8)
91.48(4.2)
97.91 (0.4)
98.93 (0.5)
98.97 (0.4)
98.31 (0.6)
99.22 (0.4)
M = 97.84
feedback, GF =

In Inc
Grp Inc
In Inc
IF+GF
IF+GF
BF+GF
99.11 (0.3)
99.01 (0.4)
99.16(0.3)
98.41 (0.6)
98.58 (0.3)
98.79 (0.5)
98.40 (0.5)
97.80 (0.5)
97.52 (0.4)
98.76 (0.6)
98.53 (0.4)
98.03 (0.8)
97.52 (0.2)
96.91 (0.5)
96.48 (0.9)
94.79(1.7)
91.96(5.9)
96.79(0.8)
96.56 (0.4)
97.38 (0.5)
97.26 (0.7)
98.19(0.5)
98.56 (0.7)
98.58 (0.6)
98.35 (0.3)
99.27 (0.2)
98.89 (0.5)
99.12(0.7)
98.30 (0.5)
98.36 (0.5)
99.34 (0.2)
99.46 (0.3)
99.37 (0.2)
M = 98.07
M = 97.99
M = 97.89
group feedback. Standard deviations are in

Figure 15 displays the average percent correct o f the participants, as a group,
across phases. As can be seen in the figure, this dependent measure remained
relatively unchanged across phases.
Figures 16 - 21 show the percent correct per session across all phases for all
participants. For consistency, data are presented in the same groupings that were used
to display total number o f checks processed correctly and rate. However, given the
lack o f any significant performance differences across sessions or phases for ten o f
the eleven participants, only P26 will be discussed. This participant’s accuracy
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decreased sharply during the sixth session, decreased steadily across sessions 11-14,
and decreased sharply again during session 19. The sharp decreases in accuracy do
not correspond with any marked changes in the total number o f checks correctly
completed in comparison to other sessions in the respective conditions, but the steady
decrease in accuracy during the individual incentives with individual feedback
condition does correspond with an initial increase in the total number o f checks
correctly completed per session. This suggests that as the participant began to
increase the quantity o f checks completed, quality briefly suffered. However, by the
fifth session of the first incentive condition, the participant’s accuracy had recovered.
Average Percent Correct by Participants in Each Phase
M=98.45
SI>=5.2

M=97.84
SD=3.5

M-97.89
SD=3A

M=98.07

SD=4.2

M=97.99
SD=4.6

Figure 15. Group average percent correct across phases.
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Figure 16. Percent correct per session by participants whose performance decreased
during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when reversed to

individual monetary incentives (P20 and P21).
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Figure 17. Percent correct per session by participants whose performance decreased
during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when reversed to
individual monetary incentives (P26 and P29).
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Figure 18. Percent correct per session by participants whose performance decreased
during the group monetary incentives condition, but failed to increase when reversed
to individual monetary incentives.
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Figure 19. Percent correct per session by participants whose performance was
comparable during the individual incentives and group incentives with individual and
group feedback conditions (P22 and P25).
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Figure 21. Percent correct per session by the participant whose performance
increased during the group monetary incentives condition.
Time on Task
Table 4 displays the average time in minutes spent on task per phase for each
participant. As can be seen in Table 4, all but one participant (P31) spent more time
on task during the individual incentive with individual feedback phase (B) than
during the hourly pay with individual feedback phase (A). Additionally, the majority
o f participants spent more time on task during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback conditions (C) than during the group incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (D), although a decreasing trend in the
amount of time spent on task across these three conditions can be seen for 5 o f the 11
participants (P23, P27, P28, P29, and P30).
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Table 4
Average Time on Task for Each Participant in Each Condition

p#

Hr Pay
IF

28.54 (6.7)
42.70(1.9)
31.88 (3.4)
36.41 (5.9)
42.76 (2.3)
41.85 (2.7)
42.01 (3.6)
44.35 (0.6)
39.15 (2.5)
38.78 (6.2)
44.90 (0.1)
M = 39.39
N ote: IF = individual
parentheses.
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

In Inc
IF
33.43 (3.6)
44.00 (0.7)
38.81 (4.8)
42.54(2.1)
44.83 (0.2)
44.93 (0.2)
42.74 (2.5)
44.70 (0.3)
41.64(1.6)
43.64(1.5)
44.52 (0.7)
M = 42.34
feedteck. GF

In Inc
IF+GF

Grp Inc
IF+GF

In Inc
IF+GF

36.57 (5.0)
33.13 (3.9)
34.30 (2.5)
43.43 (2.5)
42.96(1.3)
41.27(2.1)
43.70(1.2)
43.03 (0.9)
43.33 (1.0)
36.68 (5.8)
32.23 (2.3)
30.86 (3.5)
44.86 (0.1)
44.53 (0.4)
44.73 (0.1)
39.19 (5.0)
44.83 (0.2)
44.30(1.0)
43.96 (1.1)
43.27 (2.7)
42.66 (2.5)
41.89(2.9)
38.91 (4.0)
42.93 (1.3)
41.04(1.9)
42.86 (1.8)
41.06(2.6)
42.19(4.9)
43.64 (0.7)
43.10(1.2)
44.89 (0.1)
44.61 (0.8)
44.31 (3.0)
M = 40.66
M =41.01
M = 42.44
= group feedback. Standard deviations are in

Figure 22 displays the average time spent on task by the participants, as a
group, across phases. As can be seen in the figure, participants spent more time on
task when the individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B) was
introduced. This is consistent with overall changes in the performance o f the group on
the task. However, while the average amount o f time spent on task decreased
considerably during the group incentive condition (D), the reversal to individual
incentives shows only a slight increase in time spent on task, while overall
performance on the task showed greater increases. This increase in overall
performance by the group can be attributed more to changes in rate o f performance
than to changes in the amount o f time spent on task.
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Average Time Spent on Task by Participants in Each Phase
M=39.39
SD=1.8

o

M=42.34
SD=2.0

M=42.44
SD=2.4

M=40.66
SI>=2.5

M=41.01
SD=2.9

25

Figure 22. Group average time spent on task across phases.
Figures 23 - 28 show the time spent on task per session across all phases for
all participants. For consistency, data are presented in the same groupings that were
used to display total number o f checks processed correctly, rate o f performance, and
percent correct. In each case, changes in time spent on task are compared to overall
changes in performance on the task. The purpose o f this is to determine whether
changes in time on task account, to some extent, for overall task performance
changes.
Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition and increased when reversed to individual monetary incentives.
During the initial sessions o f the hourly pay condition (A), the time spent on task by
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P20 mimics that participant’s overall performance on the task (Figure 23). Sharp
changes in overall performance are accompanied by sharp changes in the amount of
time spent performing the task. However, as overall performance leveled off toward
the end o f the hourly pay condition (A), time spent on task actually decreased. At the
same time, rate o f performance for this participant increased, suggesting that these
two measures evened each other out, resulting in stable overall performance on the
task. During each o f the remaining conditions, sharp changes in overall performance
on the task again correspond to sharp changes in time spent working on the task,
while more subtle changes appear to be due to some combination o f changes in both
time on task and rate o f performance.
For P21, P26, and P29 (Figures 23 and 24), increases in overall performance
on the task between the hourly pay condition (A) and the individual incentives with
individual feedback condition (B) correspond to increases in the amount o f time spent
working on the task. Time spent on task then remained relatively stable throughout
the first two individual incentive conditions (B and C), mimicking overall stability in
performance on the task. When switched to the group incentive condition (D), time
spent on task decreased for each o f these participants, which accounts for the decrease
in overall task performance during this condition. Upon reversing to individual
incentives (C), the amount o f time spent on task by P26 increased sharply,
corresponding to the increase in overall performance by this participant. For P21 and
P29, changes in time on task are much more subtle, indicating that once again overall
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Figure 23. Time spent on task per session by participants whose performance
decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when
reversed to individual monetary incentives (P20 and P21).
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Time spent on task per session by participants whose performance

decreased during the group monetary incentives condition and increased when
reversed to individual monetary incentives (P26 and P29).
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performance changes were likely due to a combination o f changes in both rate of
performance and time spent on task.
Participants whose performance decreased during the group monetary
incentives condition, but failed to increase when reversed to individual monetary
incentives. The time spent performing the task by P23 during the hourly pay condition
(A) reflects overall performance on the task except for the sixth data point (Figure
25). During this session, overall performance did not vary, but time spent on task
increased significantly. Concurrently, rate o f performance decreased sharply, evening
out the overall performance (similar to what was seen with P20). During the
remaining conditions, changes in overall performance on the task seem to correspond

fairly well with changes in the amount o f time the participant spent working on the
task. In other words, increases in performance were marked by increases in time on
task and decreases marked by decreases in time on task.
For P28, while overall performance increased during the individual incentives
with individual feedback condition (B), time spent on task did not change. This
indicates that performance differences between the hourly pay condition (A) and the
individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B) were due to the
participant’s rate o f performance. During the remaining conditions (C, D, and C),
changes in overall performance appear to be affected by changes in time spent on
task, but, as seen in the Rate section, additionally by changes in rate o f performance.
In other words, throughout the final three phases o f the study, P28 spent less time on
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Figure 25. Time spent on task per session by participants whose performance
decreased during the group monetary incentives condition, but failed to increase when
reversed to individual monetary incentives.
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task and was less productive while on task, resulting in a decrease in overall
performance.
Participants whose performance was comparable during the individual
incentives and group incentives with individual and group feedback conditions. The
time spent on task by P22, P25 and P27 during the hourly pay condition (A) covaries
with overall performance on the task with the exception of the third to last data point
for P22 (Figures 26 and 27). In this session, time on task increased but overall
performance did not. Once again, this is due to a change in rate o f performance in the
opposite direction, holding overall performance at the same level. For P31, overall
performance on the task increased slightly during the hourly pay condition (A), but
this increase is due to change in rate o f performance rather than change in time on
task.
During the individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B), the
overall performance of P22 increased dramatically in the fifth session, which is
attributable to a marked increase in time spent on task. After this point, the time spent
on task by P22 remains high and stable, much like overall performance on the task.
During the reversal to individual incentives condition (C), however, overall
performance increased slightly, while time on task remained unchanged. This change
is due to an increase in rate o f performance.
Beginning in the individual incentives with individual feedback condition (B),
P25’s time on task remained at or very near the full 45 minutes. Therefore, any minor
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Figure 26. Time spent on task per session by participants whose performance was
comparable during the individual incentives and group incentives with individual and
group feedback conditions (P22 and P25).
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Figure 27. Time spent on task per session by participants whose performance was
comparable during the individual incentives and group incentives with individual and
group feedback conditions (P27 and P31).
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changes in performance occurring during the iinal four phases are necessarily due to
changes in rate o f performance.
During the fourth session o f the individual incentives with individual feedback
condition (B), the sharp decrease in performance by P27 appears to be due in part to a
decrease in time spent on task, although this does not account for the entire decrease.
Rate o f performance also decreased during this session. During the individual
incentives with individual and group feedback condition (C), all performance
measures remained stable for this participant. When exposed to group incentives (D),
overall performance became slightly more variable, and this variability is reflected in
slight changes in both time spent on task and rate o f performance. Once again, in the
fourth from last session o f the group incentive condition (D), overall performance did
not change, but time on task decreased while rate o f performance increased.
No significant changes in performance by P31 can be explained by changes in
time spent on task. Rather, any performance changes are accounted for by changes in
rate o f performance.
Participant whose performance increased during the group monetary
incentives condition. The time spent on task by P30 during the hourly pay condition
(A) decreased steadily beginning in the fourth session (Figure 28). This corresponds
to a marked decrease in overall performance on the task. Time on task increased
when switched to individual incentives (B) and remained high and stable during this
condition as well as during the first individual incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (C) and the group incentives condition (D). However, overall
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performance increased during the group incentives with individual and group
feedback condition (D) and this increase is accountable to an increase in rate o f
performance. Overall performance on the task and time on task then dramatically
decreased during the first session o f the reversal to individual incentives (C), but
recovered in both cases throughout the rest o f the phase.
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Figure 28. Time spent on task per session by the participant whose performance
increased during the group monetary incentives condition.
Individual Comparisons o f Overall Task Performance to Rate and Time on Task
Figures 29-39 display the mean performance of individual participants across
phases in terms o f the number o f checks processed correctly, the rate o f performance,
and the amount o f time spent working on the task (percent correct data did not vary
across phases, and, therefore, are not included). These summary data help to
exemplify whether, for each participant, overall changes in task performance across
phases were due to changes in rate, time spent on task, or both.
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Figure 29. Average performance across phases for P20.
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Figure 30. Average performance across phases for P21.
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Figure 31. Average performance across phases for P22.
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Figure 32. Average performance across phases for P23.
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Figure 33. Average performance across phases for P25.
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Figure 34. Average performance across phases for P26.
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Figure 35. Average performance across phases for P27.
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Figure 36. Average performance across phases for P28.
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Figure 37. Average performance across phases for P29.
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Figure 38. Average performance across phases for P30.
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Figure 39. Average performance across phases for P31.

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
Amount o f Money Earned
Table 5 displays the average amount o f money earned per session by each
participant across phases.
Table 5
Average Amount of Money Earned by Each Participant in Each Condition

. p#
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Hr Pay
IF

In Inc
IF

In Inc
IF+GF

$5.75
$4.65
$5.00
$5.75
$6.20
$6.35
$6.25
$5.75
$7.20
$5.75
$6.50
$5.80
$6.95
$7.15
$5.75
$6.55
$5.75
$6.50
$5.75
$5.80
$6.20
$6.25
$5.50
$5.75
$6.50
$5.75
$7.05
$5.40
$5.75
$5.30
$6.15
$5.75
$6.60
M = $5.75
M = $6.10 M = $6.25
Note: IF = individual incentives. GF = group incentives.

Grp Inc
IF+GF

In Inc
IF+GF

$3.55
$4.80
$5.60
$4.90
$5.30
$5.05
$5.05
$4.75
$5.25
$4.30
$5.15
M = $4.90

$5.05
$6.40
$7.95
$4.85
$7.35
$7.40
$6.55
$4.95
$7.20
$5.30
$6.90
M = $6.35

All but two participants (F20 and P30) earned, on average, more money
during the individual incentives with individual feedback condition than they had
earned during the hourly pay condition. All but three o f the participants (P23, P26,
and P28) earned still more money during the individual incentives with individual and
group feedback condition, reflecting their higher levels o f performance. All
participants earned less money during the group incentives with individual and group
feedback condition than they had during any o f the previous three conditions. Finally,
all but one participant (P23) earned more during the final individual incentive
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condition than during the group incentive condition. Participant 23 earned, on
average, $.05 less during the final phase o f the study. This participant completed only
four sessions during this final condition, and performance during the fourth session
was exceptionally low.
Figure 40 displays the average amount o f money earned by the participants, as
a group, across phases. These averages are reflective of the average changes in
overall performance on the task, with participants earning more during the individual
incentives with individual feedback condition (B) than they had earned during the
hourly pay condition (A), earning still more during the individual incentives with
individual and group feedback condition (C), earning considerably less during the
group incentive condition (D), and earning more when reversed to individual
incentives (C). It should be noted, however, that although all o f the participants
earned less under the group incentive condition than they had under the individual
incentive conditions (and the hourly pay condition as well), only 6 o f the 11
participants actually decreased their performance during the group incentive
condition and only four o f those six increased their performance when reversed to
individual incentives.
Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress
All participants took part in a debriefing session during which they completed
a preference, satisfection, and stress questionnaire (Appendix G). These data are
summarized in Table 6.
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Average Amount of Money Eamed by Participants Across Phases
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Figure 40. Average amount o f money eamed by participants across phases.
Table 6
Number o f Participants Who Ranked the Three Pay Systems Most, Second, and Least
Preferred, Satisfying, and Stressful
Satisfying

Preferred
Pay
In
Inc
Hr
Pay
Grp
Inc

StressM

Most

Second

Least

Most

Second

Least

Most

Second

Least

9

2

0

8

3

0

3

6

2

2

9

0

3

5

3

1

2

8

0

0

11

0

3

8

7

3

1

In terms o f preference, 9 o f the 11 participants indicated that they most
preferred individual incentives, while all o f the participants indicated that the group
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incentive pay system was their least preferred pay system. In terms o f satisfaction, 8
o f the 11 participants indicated that they found individual incentives to be most
satisfying o f the three pay systems, while 8 o f the 11 participants indicated that the
group incentive system was the least satisfying pay system. In terms o f stress, 7 o f the
11 participants indicated that they found group incentives to be the most stressful o f
the three pay systems, while 8 o f the 11 participants indicated that the hourly pay
system was the least stressful o f the three pay systems. Appendix N displays the
preference, satisfaction, and stress data for each participant.
Several of the participants complained about the group incentive condition
during the study, and one participant asked if he could be switched to a different
group. When this participant was told that it was not possible to switch groups, he
asked to be told who was in his group. This request was also denied. Upon reversal to
individual incentives, this same participant simply said “Yay!” Another participant,
upon receiving her first receipt from the group incentive condition stated, ‘This
sucks!” These sentiments are reflected in the feet that the majority of participants
reported that the group incentive condition was the least preferred, least satisfying,
and most stressful o f the three pay systems.
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Discussion

Previous studies have suggested that performance is comparable under
equally-divided group monetary incentives and individual monetary incentives, and
that both incentive systems are superior to hourly pay (Farr, 1976; Honeywell et al.,
1997; Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Miroff et al., 1993; Roberts & Leary, 1990;
Smoot, 1997; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989). However, recent analyses and studies
are beginning to support the suggestion that when an individual performs the same
under individual and group monetary incentives it may be due to the feet that the
individuals within the group perform similarly to each other. Results o f HoneywellJohnson et al. (2002), London and Oldham (1977), and Thurkow et al. (2000) all
support the contention that high performers may perform lower when paid group
monetary incentives than when paid individual monetary incentives.
The present study examined the performance levels o f high performers under
equally-divided group monetary incentives, individual monetary incentives, and
hourly pay to determine: (a) whether the performance levels o f high performers
would be higher under individual and group incentive pay systems than under an
hourly pay system, (b) whether the performance o f high performers would be lower
under group incentives than under individual incentives, and (c) whether changes in
performance would be due to comparative feedback indicating that the participant is a
high performer.
In addition to extending the findings o f previous research, the answers to the
current research questions are important from a business perspective. Surveys
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conducted over the past decade indicate that approximately 12% - 16% of
organizations currently use small group incentives (Honeywell et al., 1997). The
extent to which performance differs under such incentive conditions may help to
guide businesses in their decision to use group versus individual monetary incentive
systems in an attempt to increase productivity while fairly compensating their
employees.
The results o f the current findings and their implications will be discussed first
in terms o f performance, then in terms o f preference, satisfaction, and stress.
Following this discussion, suggestions for future research will be made.
Performance
The results o f the current study indicate that high performers increase their
performance when paid monetary incentives as compared to hourly pay. All but one
participant (P28) performed better when paid individual and group incentives than
when paid hourly.
The results also indicate that high performers, when paid group monetary
incentives, may or may not decrease their performance. Six o f the 11 participants
decreased their performance when exposed to the group monetary incentive
condition. Of the six participants whose performance did decrease during the group
incentive condition, only four increased their performance when reversed to
individual monetary incentives. Of the remaining five participants, the performance
o f four was comparable under group incentives to their performance under the
individual incentive conditions, and the performance o f one increased during the
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group incentive condition. Those participants who did decrease their performance
during the group incentive condition did not appear to do so as the result o f receiving
comparative feedback indicating that they were high performers in the group. The
performance levels o f only two o f these six participants (P23 and P28) decreased
during the individual incentives with individual and group feedback condition (when
the comparative feedback was first introduced), and P23’s performance levels
recovered toward the end o f the same phase. It would appear that the majority of
participants who decreased their performance during the group incentives with
individual and group feedback condition did so as the result o f earning less money
under the group incentive condition, rather than as a result o f receiving comparative
feedback.
Because only a minority o f the participants’ performance decreased during the
group incentive condition and then increased when reversed to individual monetary
incentives, it is not possible to confidently state that high performers will decrease
their performance when exposed to group incentives. When questioned, participants
who failed to decrease performance during the group monetary incentive condition
indicated that they were afraid it would decrease overall group performance even
more, thereby fiirther decreasing their pay. This suggests that verbal behavior (self
stated rules) may be a factor in deterniining whether or not an individual’s
performance will change under various pay for performance systems.
Another potential reason for the lack o f performance decrease may be that, in
the current study, it was possible for a participant to be both on task and off task at
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the same time. Because the participants were proficient at using the numeric keypad
o f the computer, and because participants attended sessions while other participants
were attending sessions on nearby computers, they could talk to one another while
they continued to perform the task. Additionally, participants were not told that they
could not use their cell phones during sessions and use o f cell phones was sometimes
observed during sessions. This ability to engage in an alternative activity (talking
with others) while still being able to perform the task may have prevented the
participants from playing computer games (the intended akemative activity), which
was not possible to do while still performing the task. However, it should be noted
that this is likely to hold true in real work situations in which individuals can talk to
others while they work. Another potential problem with running concurrent sessions
may be that participants did not feel comfortable playing games while others were in
the room and could see them being off task, especially since participants were not
told who was in their group.
The amount o f time spent working under group incentives may have also been
a factor in the lack o f performance change between individual and group monetary
incentives. Had the participants been forced to work under a condition that resulted in
less money for more sessions, they may have been less likely to maintain their high
levels o f performance. In the current study, participants attended 5-14 sessions under
the group incentive condition. It is possible that this is not a sufficient amount o f time
to produce changes in performance for some individuals.
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Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress
As stated previously, the majority o f participants found the group incentive
pay system to be the most stressful, least satisfying, and least preferred o f the three
pay systems. Therefore, although many o f the participants performed comparably
under the individual and group incentive conditions, they indicated that they found
the group incentive condition less desirable under which to work.
These results are similar to those reported by Honeywell-Johnson et al.
(2002). In that study, high performers were exposed to hourly pay with individual
feedback, individual incentives with individual feedback, and group incentives with
group feedback. All four indicated that the individual incentive pay system was their
most preferred pay system and the one with which they were most satisfied. Three o f
the four reported that the group incentive system was the most stressful and the
hourly pay was the least stressful. Participants were also asked to choose the pay
system they would like to work under in the future. All four chose the individual
incentive system. Thus, even though the participants found hourly pay to be the least
stressful, all favored the individual incentive pay.
These results also support the recent findings of Kuhn and Yockey (2003). In
one o f their investigations o f pay system preference, participants completed a survey
questionnaire on which they were asked to choose between hypothetical job offers
that differed only in terms o f the pay system used. Participants were asked to indicate
whether they would prefer the job that offered a fixed salary or a job in which they
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could possibly earn a substantial bonus. In one condition the bonus was said to be
contingent on individual performance, while in another condition the bonus was said
to be contingent on the performance of a team o f approximately 10 employees. When
the bonus was said to be contingent on individual performance, 72% o f the
participants chose this option. However, when the bonus was said to be contingent on
the performance o f the team, only 46% chose this option.
These results have implications for real work settings. If high performing
individuals are unhappy with the way they are paid, over time it is feasible that they
would become less satisfied with their job, which may lead to increases in turnover
(Miceli & Mulvey, 2000). This suggests that while performance differences may not
occur when high performers are paid group monetary incentives, businesses may still
want to exercise caution when deciding whether to use such a pay system if high
performers exist. For the purposes o f keeping job satisfaction levels, as well as
performance levels, high, an individual incentive pay system may be a better choice.
Suggestions for Future Research
Based on the results o f the current study, some suggestions for future research
should be considered. Future researchers, when using performance tasks that do not
require the participant to attend only to the task, may want to consider isolating
participants during their sessions and disallowing the use o f cell phones. In this way,
the participant’s only choice is to be on task or off task. It would not be possible to do
both.
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When questioned about their failure to decrease their performance during the
group incentive condition when they had indicated that they found it to be less
preferred, less satisfying, and more stressful than the other pay systems, two
participants stated that they would have stopped performing if they had known that
they had reached the minimum criterion during the hourly pay condition or the group
average during the group incentive condition. These participants stated that part o f the
reason they didn’t perform worse on the task was because they didn’t know how
many checks they were correctly completing during the session. This is due to the
fact that participants were not given within session feedback about their own
performance. Rather, they received both individual and group feedback before their
next session. These participants stated that they were afraid that if they stopped
performing, they might not have processed enough checks to earn their pay for the
session during the hourly pay condition, or to perform comparably to the other group
members during the group incentive condition. Future researchers may want to
consider using within session feedback to determine whether an individual’s access to
such information affects performance.
Social contingencies that may be in effect in work situations in which
individuals perform as a team were not investigated in the current study. It is likely
that, in work teams, a l members o f the group would know who the other members
were and that they would often work collaboratively. In this type o f situation, it
would be possible for individuals to exert control over other individuals’ performance
by helping other group members, making comments to or about other group
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members, etc. Future researchers may want to investigate the effects such contexts
have on both performance and satisfaction levels under hourly pay, individual
incentive, and group incentive systems.
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Appendix A
Recruitment Script
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Recruitment Script
Hello! My name is Heather McGee and I amadoctoral student in psychology at
Western Michigan University. My area o f specialization is organizational behavior
management. I am looking for individuals to participate in a study designed to
determine how individuals perform a data entry task when they are paid different
ways. The data entry task simulates the job o f a proof operator at a bank and consists
o f entering numbers using the numeric keypad on a computer. Computer games will
also be available during the sessions if individuals want to play them. The study will
be conducted in Wood Hall on WMU’s campus.
Participation will require you to attend a minimum o f25 45-minute sessions and a
maximum o f 50 sessions, for a total o f at least 18 hours 45 minutes, not to exceed 37
hours 30 minutes o f your time, over a 7 to 14 week period o f time. The amount of
money you will be paid will depend upon your performance, but it is likely that you
will earn at least $150.00 if you complete the study. You may earn more if your
performance on the task is higher than average and if you are asked to attend more
than 25 sessions.
Your participation is completely voluntary. If you choose to participate, you may
leave the study at any time. If you do leave the study early, you will be paid for your
participation up to that point. Your willingness to participate in, or your withdrawal
from the study at any time, will in no way affect your grade in this or any other class.
If you would like to learn more about this study and play computer games at least one
hour a week, please print your name, phone number and email address on a sheet o f
paper and give it to me. I am also handing out a sheet o f paper with my name,
telephone number and email address, and you can contact me by telephone or email if
you prefer.
I win be contacting you within the next few days to arrange a time that we can meet
to discuss the details o f the study.
Thank you for your time!
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Appendix B
Participant Computer Game Use Screening Questionnaire
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Participant Number________________
Please complete the following questions. All information you provide will remain
confidential.

1. Do you play any o f the following computer games?
Tetris______________Yes
No
Solitaire____________Yes
No
Pinball__________ ___Yes
No
Minesweeper
Yes
No
Hearts
_ _ Yes
No
Spider Solitaire
Yes
No
Freecell_________ ___Yes
No
2. If you play games, how often do you play?
1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4 5 6 7 8 9
times a day
4
5
6
7 days a week
4 times a month

3. Do you know anyone that has signed up to participate in the study? Please list
their names.

4. If you know anyone that might be interested in signing up for the study, please
refer them to Heather McGee at (269) 470-0506.

Thank you!
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Appendix C
Pay Condition Quiz
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Pay Condition Q n lz

Participant:_____________

HOURLY PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $5.75 for a 45-minute session.
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $.006 for every check correctly processed during the
session.
GROUP INCENTIVE PAY SYSTEM:
Individuals are paid $.006 for every check correctly processed during the
session, determined by the group’s average number of correctly processed
checks.
Answer the following questions based on the above pay systems,
1. Sally correctly processed 1120 checks during a session. Sally’s group correctly
processed 1000 checks.
A. What amount would SaUy earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay
system?

B. What amount would Sally earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE
pay system?

C. What amount would Sally earn under the HOURLY pay system?

2. Don correctly processed 800 checks during a session. Don’s group correctly
processed 1200 checks.
A. What amount would Don earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay system?

B. What amount would Don earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE
pay system?

C. What amount would Don earn under the HOURLY pay system?
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3. Virginia correctly processed 650 checks during a session. Virginia’s group
correctly processed 620 checks.
A. What amount would Virginia earn under the GROUP INCENTIVE pay
system?

B. What amount would Virginia earn under the INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE pay
system?

C. What amount would Virginia earn under the HOURLY pay system?
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Consent Document
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The Effects o f Hourly Pay, Individual Monetary Incentives and
Group Monetary Incentives on Performance
Western Michigan University
Department o f Psychology
Principal Investigator: Dr. Alyce M. Dickinson
Student Investigator: Heather M. McGee
I have been invited to participate in a research study intended to investigate the
effects of different types o f pay on work performance. This project is Heather
McGee’s dissertation project. Dr. Dickinson is her advisor.
Participation requirements. During today’s introductory session, my eligibility to
participate in this study will be determined. First, I must indicate that I spend a certain
amount o f time using computer games and that I am available to attend scheduled
sessions. Second, the experimenter will explain the ways I will be paid durii^ the
study. After that explanation, I must pass a quiz that tests my understanding o f the
ways I will be paid. Additionally, participants in the study need to perform at certain
levels on the data entry task. My performance on the data entry task will be assessed
during today’s session. If I perform at a certain level and meet the other eligibility
requirements, I will be invited to participate. If not, I will be paid $5.75 for attending
the session, hut will not be invited to participate in the study.
Explanation o f study procedures and length o f participation. I will perform a
computerized data entry task. Simulated bank checks will be displayed on the
computer screen and I will type the amounts o f the cheeks using the computer
keyboard. Each session will be 45 minutes and I will be asked to attend at least 25
sessions. Thus, my total time commitment wiU be at least 18 hours 45 minutes. I may
be asked to attend up to 50 sessions, for a total o f 37 hours 30 minutes. I will be asked
to schedule at least three sessions per week, thus I will be involved in the study for 8
to 13 weeks. I will be able to take a break and engage in other activities (i.e.,
computer games) at any time during my scheduled sessions.
Compensation. I will receive monetary compensation for my participation in the
study. I will receive $5.75 immediately following today’s introductory session.
During the study, I will be paid three different ways. In some sessions, I will be paid
$5.75 per session as long as I correctly process a minimum o f 490 checks. In other
sessions, the amount o f money I vsdll earn wMl depend upon how many checks I
correctly process. In other sessions, the total amount o f money I earn wiU depend on
the average number o f correctly processed checks completed by the group to which I
am assigned. I will be paid in cash once a week. The total amount o f money I w il
earn wffl depend upon my performance and the performance o f my group, hut it is
likely that I will earn at least $120.00 if I complete the study. I may earn more if my
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performance on the task is higher than average and if Dr. Dickinson and Heather
McGee ask me to attend more than 25 sessions. The more sessions I attend, the more
money I will make.
Benefits. The only benefit I will receive for participating in this study wiU be the
amount of money I earn. The data obtained firom this study will help determine how
different pay systems affect the performance o f individuals. This knowledge may
allow businesses to design better pay systems.
Risks. The amount o f time it will take to participate in this study will be inconvenient.
I may experience physical discomfort associated with the data entry task. This will be
ofiset by the fact that the computer workstations have been set up in accordance with
accepted ergonomic standards provided by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. In addition, I may take work breaks whenever I want and will be
prompted by the experimenter to take breaks during the session. During the 45minute sessions, I may also encounter fatigue or mild stress while performing the
task. This will be of&et by the feet that I can take breaks and/or engage in alternative
activities whenever I want. Because o f past experience with the type o f task that will
be used in this study, individuals perform differently on it. My performance may be
different than the performance o f others and this may be stressful to me as w ell
Confidentiality. All information obtained in this study will remain strictly
confidential. When results o f the study are presented publicly, I will not be identified.
I will be assigned a number and that number will be used to identify my data. By
signing this consent document, I am giving permission for data obtained in this study
to be presented in professional presentations and publications.
Voluntary participation. My participation in this study is entirely voluntary. I may
withdraw firom the study at any time without penalty. If I do withdraw, I will receive
the amount o f money that I have earned up to that point. My participation in the
study, or my withdrawal from the study, will not affect my grades in any o f my
courses. At the end o f the study, the experimenter will answer any questions I have
and explain how my data will help to learn more about pay systems.
Who to contact with questions. If I have any questions concerning this study I may
call Heather McGee at (269) 470-0506. In addition. Dr. Dickinson, the feculty advisor
for the study, can be reached at 387-4473. I may also contact the Chair, Human
Subjects Institutional Review Board (387-8293), or the Vice President for Research,
at 387-8298, if questions or problems arise during the course o f the study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human
Subjects Institutional Review Board as indicated by the stamped date and signature o f
the board chair in the upper right comer. Participants should not sign this document if
the comer does not have a stamped date and signature.
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My signature below indicates that I understand the above information and agree
to participate in the study.
Participant Signature

Date

Consent obtained by:____________________________________________________
Initials of researcher
Date
Please keep the attached copy o f this form fo r your records.
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HSIRB Approval Letter
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W e s t e r n M i c h i g a n U n iv e r s it y
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

{•fjnt.il

Date:

N ovem ber 17, 2003

To:

A lyce D ickinson, Principal Investigator
H eather M cG ee, Student Investigator

From : M ary L agerw ey, Ph.D ., C hair
Re:

H SIR B P ro ject N um ber: 03-11 -04

T his letter w ill serve as confirm ation that your research project entitled “The Effects o f
H ourly Pay, Individual M onetary Incentive Pay and G roup M onetary Incentive Pay on
H igh P erform ance” has been a p p ro v e d under the e x p e d ited category o f review by the
H um an Subjects Institutional R eview Board. The conditions and duration o f this approval
are specified in th e P olicies o f W estem M ichigan U niversity. Y ou m ay now begin to
im plem ent th e research as described in the application.
P lease note that you m ay only conduct this research exactly in the form it was approved.
Y ou m ust seek specific board approval for any changes in this project. You m ust also
seek reapproval i f the p roject extends beyond the term ination date noted below. In
addition i f there are any unanticipated adverse reactions o r unanticipated events
associated w ith th e conduct o f this research, you should im m ediately suspend the project
and contact th e C h air o f the H SIR B for consultation.
T he B oard w ishes you success in the pursuit o f your research goals.

A pproval T erm ination:

N ovem ber 17, 2004

WaiwtitHi Hall. Kalamazoo. Ml 49008-Yl:>6
fKtiw

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38T 8293 iax

3 8 U 8 .'.'b

123

Appendix F
Computer-Based Task Sample Screen
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Appendix G
Data Recording Form
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Appendix H
Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress Level Questionnaire
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Satisfaction and Stress Questionnaire

Participant:______

Instructions: Please write short answers to the following questions.
1. Originally, what did you believe to be the purpose o f this research?

2. Now, what do you believe is the purpose o f the study?

3. If your answers to 1 and 2 are different, when did you change your belief?
During the Hourly pay condition
During the first Individual Incentive pay condition
During the second Individual Incentive pay condition
During the Group Incentive pay condition
During the third Individual Incentive pay condition
4. Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms ofhow much you preferred them. Start with the one you preferred
the most.
1. __________________ (most preferred pay system)
2 . _____________________
3. __________________ (least preferred pay system)
5. Please describe why you ranked them as you did:

6. Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms ofhow stressful they were. Start with the one that was most
stressful.
1. __________________ (most stressful pay system)
2 . _____________________
3.
(least stressful pay system)
7. Please describe why you ranked them as you did:

8.

Rank order the hourly pay, the individual incentive pay and the group incentive
pay in terms ofhow satisfying they were. Start with the one that was most
satisfying.
1.
(most satisfying pay system)
2.
(least satisfying pay system)

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
9. Please describe why you ranked them as you did;

10. How many other people participated in your incentive group during the Group
Incentive condition? _________
11. How do you know that?

12. Additional Comments:
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Appendix I
Pay Receipt (Hourly Pay and First Individual Incentive Condition)
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SESSION RECEIPT

Participant Number:

Session Date:

Number o f Checks Completed Correctly:

Amount Earned (Hourly):

_________

Amount Earned (Ind. Incentives):

$.006 X
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Appendix J
Pay System Description/Feedback/Altemative Activities Script
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Description o f Pay Systems Script
McGee Dissertation
Before the session begins, tell the participant what pay condition is in effect and read
the following description for that pay condition;
INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVE CONDITION: Today you will be working in the
individual monetary incentive condition. You will be paid based on number o f checks
you correctly process during this session. For every check you correctly process, you
will be paid $.006.
GROUP INCENTIVE CONDITION: Today you will be working in the group
monetary incentive condition. You will be paid based on the average number of
checks correctly processed by the group o f 10 to which you are assigned. For every
check in the group average, you will be paid $.006.
HOURLY PAY CONDITION: Today you will be working in the hourly pay
condition. You will be paid $5.75 for the session, provided you correctly process a
minimum o f 490 checks.

Feedback Script
Before the session begins, give the subject his/her receipt for the last session and read
the following (do not read the part in parentheses during the hourly pay condition):
During your last session th e
pay condition was in
effect. You correctly processed_________ checks. (The group
correctly processed_________ checks.) Therefore, the amount
of money you earned for that session is ______ .
If it is the first session o f the week, or the first session o f a new phase, tell the
participant the total pay earned during the past week and pay the participant.

Alternative Task Script
As in previous sessions, you may take work breaks whenever you like. Computer
games are available on the computer.
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Appendix K
Pay Receipt (Individual and Group Incentives)
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SESSION RECEIPT

Participant Number:

Session Date:

Number o f Checks Completed Correctly:

Number o f Checks Completed Correctly by Group:

Amount Earned:

$.006 X_____________ ==
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Appendix L
Pay Scale
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Pay Scale
# Checks Pay
100-104
$0.60
$0.65
105-113
114-121
$0.70
$0.75
122-129
$0.80
130-138
$0.85
139-146
147-154
$0.90
$0.95
155-163
$1.00
164-171
$1.05
172-179
180-188
$1.10
$1.15
189-196
197-204
$1.20
$1.25
205-213
$1.30
214-221
$1.35
222-229
$1.40
230-238
$1.45
239-246
247-254
$1.50
$1.55
255-263
$1.60
264-271
$1.65
272-279
$1.70
280-288
$1.75
289-296
297-304
$1.80
$1.85
305-313
$1.90
314-321
$1.95
322-329
$2.00
330-338
$2.05
339-346
$2.10
347-354
$2.15
355-363
$2.20
364-371
$2.25
372-379
$2.30
380-388
$2.35
389-396
397^04
$2.40
$2.45
405-413
$2.50
414-421
$2.55
422-429
$2.60
430-438
$2.65
439-446

# Checks Pay
497-504
$3.00
$3.05
505-513
$3.10
514-521
$3.15
522-529
$3.20
530-538
539-546
$3.25
547-554
$3.30
555-563
$3.35
564-571
$3.40
572-579
$3.45
$3.50
580-588
589-596
$3.55
597-604
$3.60
605-613
$3.65
$3.70
614-621
$3.75
622-629
$3.80
630-638
$3.85
639-646
647-654
$3.90
$3.95
655-663
$4.00
664-671
672-679
$4.05
$4.10
680-688
$4.15
689-696
697-704
$4.20
$4.25
705-713
$4.30
714-721
$4.35
722-729
$4.40
730-738
739-746
$4.45
747-754
$4.50
755-763
$4.55
$4.60
764-771
$4.65
772-779
$4.70
780-788
$4.75
789-796
$4.80
797-804
805-813
$4.85
$4.90
814-821
$4.95
822-829
830-838
$5.00
$5.05
839-846

# Checks Pay
897-904
905-913
914-921
922-929
930-938
939-946
947-954
955-963
964-971
972-979
980-988
989-996
997-1004
1005-1013
1014-1021
1022-1029
1030-1038
1039-1046
1047-1054
1055-1063
1064-1071
1072-1079
1080-1088
1089-1096
1097-1104
1105-1113
1114-1121
1122-1129
1130-1138
1139-1146
1147-1154
1155-1163
1164-1171
1172-1179
1180-1188
1189-1196
1197-1204
1205-1213
1214-1221
1222-1229
1230-1238
1239-1246

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

$5.40
$5.45
$5.50
$5.55
$5.60
$5.65
$5.70
$5.75
$5.80
$5.85
$5.90
$5.95
$6.00
$6.05
$6.10
$6.15
$6.20
$6.25
$6.30
$6.35
$6.40
$6.45
$6.50
$6.55
$6.60
$6.65
$6.70
$6.75
$6.80
$6.85
$6.90
$6.95
$7.00
$7.05
$7.10
$7.15
$7.20
$7.25
$7.30
$7.35
$7.40
$7.45

138

447-454
455-463
464-471
472-479
480-488
489-496

$2.70
$2.75
$2.80
$2.85
$2.90
$2.95

Pay Scale Continued
$5.10
847-854
855-863
$5.15
$5.20
864-871
872-879
$5.25
$5.30
880-888
$5.35
889-896

1247-1254
1255-1263
1264-1271
1272-1279
1280-1288
1289-1296

$7.50
$7.55
$7.60
$7.65
$7.70
$7.75
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Appendix M
Debriefing Script
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Script for Debriefing
McGee Dissertation
Following the last session o f participation;
1. Thank the subject for participating in the research study.
2. Explain the purpose o f the study as follows:
A. Previous research has demonstrated that when people are paid
individual or group monetary incentives, they perform better than when
they are paid hourly rates.
B. Studies that have compared performance under individual and group
monetary incentives have had mixed results. For example, some studies
have found no differences in performance when individuals have been
exposed to both group and individual monetary incentives. Other studies
have found that performance is lower when individuals are paid group ,
incentives than when they are paid individual incentives.
C. One reason for these conflicting results may be that, in some o f the
studies, the performance o f the group was relatively equal to the
performance o f the individual (in this situation, the money earned by the
individual would have been the same under both incentive systems).
However, in other studies, the performance o f the group may have been
lower than the performance o f the individual (in this situation, the
individual would have earned less when paid group monetary incentives
than when paid individual monetary incentives).
D. Recent research supports the idea that high performance may decrease
when individuals are paid group monetary incentives.
E. The purpose o f this study is to determine if high performance
decreases when individuals are paid group incentives as compared to
performance when individuals are paid individual incentives.
F. If high performance decreases when individuals are paid group
incentives organizations may want to consider implementir^ an individual
monetary incentive system instead o f a group monetary incentive system
to keep performance levels up.
G. Ask if they understand this, and/or if they have additional questions.
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3. Explain the five phases of the study as follows;
A. Phase 1 was an hourly pay with mdividual feedback condition in
which you were paid $5.75 per session, as long as you correctly completed
490 checks. In work settings, employees must perform at minimum levels
to avoid supervisory criticism and being fired. This niinimiim requirement
was designed to simulate that contingency.
B. Phase 2 was an individual monetary incentive with individual
feedback condition. In this phase, you were paid based on how many
checks you correctly processed in each session. This phase was included
to determine whether your performance would increase, decrease, or
remain the same when you were paid monetary incentives.
C. Phase 3 was an individual monetary incentive with individual and
group feedback condition. In this phase, you were paid based on how
many checks you correctly processed in each session. You were given
both individual and group feedback during this phase. However, there
wasn’t actually a group, and the average performance o f the group was
contrived. It was calculated so that the group’s performance was 25%
lower than your performance.
D. Phase 4 was a group monetary incentive with individual and group
feedback condition. In this phase, you were paid based on how many
checks the simulated group correctly processed. Again, however, there
wasn’t actually a group and the average performance o f the group was
contrived to be 25% lower than your performance.
E. Phase 5 was a reversal to mdividual monetary incentives with
individual and group feedback (Phase 3).
F. During Phases 3-5, both individual and group feedback were included
to control for the fact that individuals may perform difierently as a
function o f being made aware o f the fact that they are a high performers as
compared to others in their group. By holding this information constant
across phases, any performance changes that occurred when you were paid
different ways would necessarily be due to the pay condition in effect, not
the feedback that was provided.
G. Ask if they understand this, and/or have additional questions.
4. Show the participant graphs o f his/her performance (scores, rate, time on task,
accuracy). Ask if the participant has questions about the graphs.
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5. Explain how the participant’s performance relates to the research question (e.g.,
did the participant’s performance increase, decrease or remain the same
throughout the group incentive condition).
6. Ask the subject if s/he has questions regarding participation. Answer those
questions.
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Appendix N
Pay System Preference, Satisfaction, and Stress Rankings

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144
Preference
F#

Most

Second

Least

20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Individual
Individual
Individual
Hourly
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Hourly
Individual

Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Individual
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Individual
Hourly

Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group
Group

Satisfaction
P#

Most

Second

Least

20
21

Hourly
Individual
Individual
Hourly
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Individual
Hourly
Individual

Individual
Hourly
Hourly
Individual
Group
Hourly
Hourly
Group
Hourly
Individual
Group

Group
Group
Group
Group
Hourly
Group
Group
Hourly
Group
Group
Hourly

23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Stress
P#

Most

Second

Least

20
21
22
23
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Group
Group
Individual
Individual
Group
Group
Group
Hourly
Group
Individual
Group

Individual
Hourly
Group
Group
Individual
Individual
Hourly
Individual
Individual
Group
Individual

Hourly
Individual
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
Individual
Group
Hourly
Hourly
Hourly
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